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Regulating at the End of Privacy
Bruce E. Boydent

INTRODUCTION

Web surfers, repent: the end of privacy is nigh. Or at least,
so say many reporters, scholars, and commentators; forecasts of
the impending death of privacy are legion. The cause of death
varies-from government surveillance,'
to corporate data
gathering, 2 to social media,3 to all three 4-but almost no one
claims that privacy is in a healthy state.5 Indeed, the consensus
appears to be that some sort of privacy catastrophe is upon us.
That pervasive sense of impending doom will likely affect
legislators, regulators, and judges as well, ultimately provoking
a broad regulatory response. 6
t Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. I wish to thank the
University of Chicago Legal Forum for inviting me to present this Article, and Amy
Quester for her love, encouragement, and support.
See, for example, The End of Privacy?, NY Times SR10 (July 15, 2012); Jed
Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 Stan L Rev 101 (2008); A. Michael Froomkin, The
Death of Privacy, 52 Stan L Rev 1461 (2000).
2 See, for example, Brendan Lynch and Danielle Rivard, Google's Invasion Leaves
Privacy as Tiny Casualty, Boston Herald 4 (Sept 20, 2011); The End of Privacy?,
Consumer Reports 33 (June 2006).
3 See, for example, Evgeny Morozov, The Dangers of Sharing, NY Times BR18 (Jan
27, 2012); Daniel J. Solove, The End of Privacy?, 299 Scientific American 100 (Sept
2008).
See generally Jeffrey Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in
America (Random House 2000); Clifford S. Fishman, Technology and the Internet: The
Impending Destruction of Privacy by Betrayers, Grudgers, Snoops, Spammers,
Corporations,and the Media, 72 Geo Wash L Rev 1503 (2004).
5 See Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: "Get Over It", Wired (Jan 26, 1999), online at
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/01/17538 (visited Sept 15, 2013) (quoting
Scott McNealy, then-CEO of Sun Microsystems, as saying, "You have zero privacy
anyway. Get over it."). McNealy's epigram appears in context to have been more of an
exasperated response to persistent questioning rather than a considered view of the
state of privacy. Nevertheless, it has been widely cited as reflecting a plausible view of
reality.
6 American privacy law has largely been jerry-built from the reactions to such
crises. See, for example, Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze at 170 (cited in note 4); Daniel J.
Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databasesand Metaphors for Information Privacy,
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But the very extent of the alarm over privacy should give us
pause. Privacy, as I argue below, has an observer problem.7 It is
extraordinarily difficult for persons to objectively assess the
state of privacy in their own society, because their self-identities
are inextricably linked to the privacy norms prevailing at the
time those identities were constructed.8 As a result, it is
ordinarily impossible to view shifts in or challenges to privacy
norms with equanimity. The state of alarm over current privacy
developments is therefore at best an ambiguous signal.
Widespread alarm could, it is true, indicate that it has become
easier or perhaps simply more profitable to violate privacy
norms, for example due to technological changes. But it can also
signify an incipient alteration of privacy norms themselves.
Violations should certainly be resisted; for revolutions, however,
the proper response is less clear.
That ambiguity might not be a problem if there were ways
to determine the state of privacy other than measuring the level
of anxiety. But privacy is inherently subjective in a way that the
targets of other laws are not. 9 Other laws have as their object
creating, maintaining, or altering a certain tangible state of the
world-they regulate the exchange of funds, the dispersion of
inventions and works of authorship, the performance of services,
or the prevention of physical harm. Privacy protects dignity.1 0 It
is a set of social conventions governing the flow of information
about individuals; it restricts the dissemination of information
about individuals that can harm their social standing and their
53 Stan L Rev 1393, 1441 (2001).
An observer effect occurs when the act of measuring a system has a significant
enough impact on the system that it cannot be ignored. In such a case, "the observer
must be considered part of the system being observed." Wikipedia, Observer Effect
(Physics),online at http: len.wikipedia.org/wikilObserver effect physics (visited Sept 15,
2013).
8 By "privacy" I mean to refer to both a certain condition-the state of being
"private"-and the complex of rules and laws necessary to achieve that statute. See text
accompanying notes 27-30.
9 See, for example, Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community
and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 Cal L Rev 957, 964 (1989) ("[T]he tort of invasion
of privacy is qualitatively different because the injury at issue is logically entailed by,
rather than merely contingently caused by, the improper conduct."); Diane Leenheer
Zimmerman, Musings on a Famous Law Review Article: The Shadow of Substance, 41
Case W Res L Rev 823, 826 (1991) ("Like a flag which has not been assigned a country,
privacy is rich in symbolic value but has little particularized meaning.").
10 See Post, 77 Cal L Rev at 964 (cited in note 9) (classifying privacy tort as
redressing "dignitary harms"). Privacy also provides security and seclusion, but these,
too, are intangible.
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attempts to determine their own identities." Privacy harms are
therefore difficult to measure objectively. They exist to the
extent that we collectively believe them to exist, which means
that the best evidence of many forms of privacy harm will be the
level of alarm violations provoke.12
The result is that privacy is subject to a sort of uncertainty
principle. In physics, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle states
that it is impossible to determine both a subatomic particle's
velocity and position with absolute certainty; our knowledge of
one recedes as the other increases.13 Similarly for privacy, we
can measure the current state of alarm in our own society, or we
can assess privacy norm change in another society, but we can't
reliably assess privacy norm change in our own society.' 4 The
problem is that the observer is part of the system being
measured.
And there is the rub, the one that makes calamity of so
much commentary. Privacy scholars and policymakers are just
as subject to the risks of cognitive bias as anyone else. They are
just as liable to mistake deep social change for selfish violations.
The "privacy uncertainty principle" makes it difficult to decide
whether and how to respond to an apparent privacy crisis.
And yet a decision may be unavoidable. The purpose of
privacy laws is to buttress privacy norms where informal
sanctions prove inadequate.' 5 A sudden increase in violations is

11See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 Cal L Rev 1087, 1129 (2002)
(defining privacy as comprising "various activities, customs, norms, and traditions");
Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy and the Integrity of Social Life
140-47 (Stanford 2010); Post, 77 Cal L Rev at 969 (cited in note 9) (privacy "can only be
understood by reference to norms of behavior").
12 Some privacy violations lead to tangible harms, such as being arrested by the
secret police or having one's financial accounts compromised. These sorts of harms,
because of their tangibility, are far less susceptible to the ambiguity problem described
in the text. See Part II.B.
13 Heisenberg's
uncertainty principle is often misdescribed as a simple
measurement problem, but in fact it represents an inherent limit on what we can know
about reality. See Geoff Brumfiel, Common Interpretation of Heisenberg's Uncertainty
Principle Is Proved False, Scientific American (Sept 11, 2012), online at
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id-common-interpretation-of-heisenbergsuncertainty-principle-is-proven-false (visited Sept 15, 2013).
14 Unlike Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, the uncertainty described here is due
to a measurement problem: the difficulty in objectively weighing the harms and benefits
arising from contemporary social practices.
15 The dynamics of the relationship between law and norms are underexplored, but
a number of scholars have suggested that law can and does fill the gap when norms
weaken in effectiveness. See Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors

176

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2013

a powerful signal that the laws require modification to combat
the problem. The danger posed by uncertainty, however, is that
laws passed to cure violations may instead lock in a fading and
increasingly obsolete regime of privacy norms, making the
transition more difficult, expensive, and stressful than it
otherwise might have been. That risk counsels caution in
crafting any policy response in a crisis atmosphere, given the
difficulty of determining what state privacy is currently in, and
the relative benefits of any future regime.
The argument below proceeds in three parts. First, in
Part I, I identify the two features of privacy that give rise to
privacy crises and the uncertainty problem: the basis of privacy
in norms and its connection to status. In Part II, I consider a
historical example of norm regime change in order to examine
the phenomenon in action while maintaining some critical
distance. The example I consider is the history of the changes
that led to Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis's famous 1890
article, the article that launched the very concept of privacy
law.1 6 Part III then draws upon that example to suggest that at
least some of the anxieties of our own time are due to another
shift in norms. Even if such a shift is occurring, however, there
is no good way to determine whether such a shift should be
resisted or not. I argue that the incommensurability of
competing privacy norm regimes arising from the uncertainty
problem hinders an objective evaluation of the relative costs and
benefits. Given the privacy uncertainty principle, policymakers
should use caution in adopting laws or regulations that are
meant to stave off change, except in those instances where
privacy harms are manifest. Even then, policymakers should

Settle Disputes 283-84 (Harvard 1991) (noting that norms are less effective as stakes
rise or social distance increases); Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex
Economy: The StructuralApproach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U Pa L
Rev 1643, 1674-75 (1996) (citing examples); Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process,
10 Harv CR-CL L Rev 269, 301 (1975) (describing judiciary's most important function as
participating in the "evolution . . . of social norms and understandings as they come to
find expression in the law"); Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as
Prerogativeand Privacy, 105 Yale L J 2117, 2178-80 (1996) (describing shifts in law to
preserve status regimes); J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 Yale L J 2313,
2334 (1997) ("Both subordinate and superordinate groups may lash out at each other,
wielding the weapons of rhetoric, law, or brute force: the former to demand new social
prestige, the latter to reinforce and reproduce old hierarchies of respect and social
meaning.").
16 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv L Rev
193 (1890).
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prefer regulatory tools that are easier to adapt to social change,
such as administrative regulations or reasonableness standards.
I. THE SOURCES OF A PRIVACY CRISIS
Privacy crises are not new; there have been waves of
anxiety over privacy ever since the late nineteenth century. In
each, forecasts of the "death of privacy" were common. In the
1870s, the New York Times predicted the "abolition of privacy"
resulting from, of all things, the newspaper interview.1 7 In the
1890s, Warren and Brandeis echoed a widespread complaint
when they claimed that "[t]he press is overstepping in every
direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency."1 8 The
1960s saw similar fears of an "assault on privacy" arising from
use of mechanized data gathering and storage tools.19 And as
noted above, since 1999 fears of the "end of privacy" have been
widespread. 20
Obviously, privacy did not come to an end in any of these
episodes, nor is it likely to now. But that does not mean that the
apocalyptic rhetoric was or is disingenuous. Such rhetoric is,
rather, often a sign of some emerging threat to the social order.
In particular, doomsday prophecies are especially likely at times
when the existing methods for determining social status are
under challenge or in flux. 2 1
And that is the likely source of the repeated alarms over
privacy. As explained below, privacy is an integral component of
the set of norms that determine social status. It is privacy norms
17 See The Abolition of Privacy, NY Times
4 (Aug 4, 1874). See also Glenn Wallach,
'A Depraved Taste for Publicity. The Press and Private Life in the Gilded Age, 39 J Am
Stud 31, 36, 38 (1998). The interview, which was at the time a novel journalistic
technique, seems to have been the "oversharing" of its time. See Michael Schudson,
Discoveringthe News: A Social History of American Newspapers 66 (Basic 1978).
18
Warren and Brandeis, 4 Harv L Rev at 196 (cited in note 16). See also Cond6
Benoist Pallen, Newspaperism, Lippincott's Monthly 470, 475 (Nov 1886) ('"Through the
newspaper no man's private life is sacred, and least of all that of a public man.").
19
Samantha Barbas, Saving Privacy from History, 61 DePaul L Rev 973, 1032
(2012). The surge in concern about privacy in the 1960s has been under-studied. For a
good overview, see id at 1031-38.
20
See, for example, Froomkin, 52 Stan L Rev at 1465 (cited in note 1) (expressing
concern that given technological developments, "it seems likely that soon all but the
most radical privacy freaks may live in the informational equivalent of a goldfish bowl").
21
See J.M. Balkin, 106 Yale L J at 2328 (cited in note 15) ("Groups often pursue
status competition with amazing vehemence."); Bruce E. Boyden, Constitutional Safety
Valve: The Privileges or Immunities Clause and Status Regimes in a FederalistSystem,
62 Ala L Rev 111, 132-36 (2010).
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that govern how information about individuals can be acceptably
gathered and distributed. Individuals in turn rely on those
norms in deciding how to behave and what to say as they try to
maximize their standing with various groups. Changes to
privacy norms can be incredibly disruptive for individuals,
upending settled expectations with potentially embarrassing
results for those adhering to the old regime.
Three features of this web of norms, individuals, and social
status make alarm a likely response to the prospect of change. 22
First, status is critically important to individuals, and they
invest heavily in attaining it by adapting their behaviors, and
even their personalities, to achieving it in particular ways. 23
That makes it extremely difficult for individuals to alter their
behaviors in response to a shift in norms. Second, changes to
norm regimes, when they do occur, often come not gradually and
predictably but instead suddenly and catastrophically.
Adherents to an existing norm regime, and the status
determinations that come with it, are thus quite correct to
become nervous at even the first signs of pressure for a change.
Finally, status is rarely openly acknowledged and may even be
invisible to the participants in a battle over norms. 24 That
makes it extraordinarily difficult to debate the merits of a shift
in norms, or even to ascertain whether one is in progress.
The dynamics of status regimes in transition have
important ramifications for privacy law. The law should step in,
where it can be effective, to arrest an increase in privacy norm

" There is a substantial literature on the interaction between law, social norms,
and status. For recent overviews, see generally Richard H. McAdams and Eric B.
Rasmusen, Norms in Law and Economics, in A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell,
eds, 2 Handbook of Law and Economics 1573 (Elsevier 2007); Robert C. Ellickson, The
Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspective from the Legal Academy, in Michael Hechter
and Karl-Dieter Opp, eds, Social Norms 35 (Russell Sage 2001).
22 It is possible that not only status attributions but the need for status itself has
changed over time or varies between societies. Most examinations of status come from
the social sciences, and for the most part social scientists assume the desire for status to
be constant. See Bonnie Erickson, Social Networks, in Judith R. Blau, ed, Blackwell
Companion to Sociology 314, 325 (Blackwell Publishing 2001) ("Simmel's work is
unusual in its attention to history; too much of our work is very much limited to the
present."). In any event, I have seen no indication that Americans in the late nineteenth
century were dramatically more or less independent of their peers than Americans now.
2
See Ellickson, Order Without Law at 117 (cited in note 15) (finding cattle owners
in dispute over status "never refer to, or perhaps even consciously recognize, the
symbolic overtones" of their battles); Susan T. Fiske, InterpersonalStratification:Status,
Power, and Subordination, in Susan T. Fiske, Daniel T. Gilbert, and Gardner Lindzey,
eds, Handbook of Social Psychology 941, 941 (John Wiley & Sons 5th ed 2010).
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violations. But it is far less clear that the law should step in to
prevent a shift in privacy norms from occurring. Distinguishing
between the two, to the extent possible, is therefore an
important precursor to determining whether new laws or
regulations are required. The privacy uncertainty principle
makes this difficult, however. It is thus necessary to identify
when privacy crises are likely to be related to a shift in norms,
in particular a shift in those norms governing how personal
information can be gathered and distributed.
A.

Status and Social Norms

There are a few different ways in which one can understand
the term "privacy."25 First, it might refer to a state that a person
achieves-an individual's acts, thoughts, words, or attributes
are "private" to the extent that information about them is
limited in some way. Second, it might refer to the web of
informal rules that are in place in a society to allow individuals
to achieve that state. Third, it might refer to both of these things
at once-the ways in which a society defines not only what
states qualify as "private," 26 but also the cluster of social rules
and practices that are intended to protect that state. Or fourth,
it might refer to the set of formal laws and regulations that
restrict behaviors that threaten the ability of individuals to
achieve the state designated as "privacy," however defined.
For the most part, this Article has been using the term in
the third sense: as the way in which a society first defines what
information is justifiably kept within a limited circle of
recipients and then imposes obligations on others to maintain
that confidentiality. 2 7 Those rules about what can reasonably be
kept private, and what others may do with information about

15 For a somewhat similar discussion, see Ruth Gavison,
Privacy and the Limits of
Law, 89 Yale L J 421, 424 (1980) ("[Ils privacy a situation, a right, a claim, a form of
control, a value?").
26 This way of using the term is not uncontested. Privacy
is sometimes described as
a universal human need that has the same meaning in every context. However, such a
theory has difficulty accounting for the incredible variation in privacy practices that
exist even among democratic societies. See James Q. Whitman, Two Western Cultures of
Privacy, 113 Yale L J 1153, 1153-60 (2004).
27
will use the term "state of privacy" to refer only to the conditions that a society
designates as "private"; "privacy norms" to refer to obligations imposed on others in the
collection or distribution of such information; and "privacy law" to refer to the formal
rules governing information practices.
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others that they receive, consist largely of social norms. 28 Norms
are informal rules, 29 enforced outside of the state, that are
responsible for much of the social order that exists in society. 30
And privacy norms, like all norms, change over time. What
makes changes to privacy norms so disruptive is their
connection to status.
Status can be defined as the amount of honor, respect,
prestige, or esteem accorded to an individual by others. 31 Status
varies by context; 32 a single individual may have multiple
statuses in the various roles that he or she occupies, accorded by
the various groups he or she is a member of. 33 Norms govern
how those status determinations are made. Norms may specify
that certain personal qualities and attributes merit according
high or low status, or they may designate higher or lower status
for membership in certain groups. 34 An individual's own
compliance with prevailing norms also affects his or her status. 35
Others will judge a person negatively who fails to behave in the
ways deemed appropriate for his or her particular role and
position in a group's status hierarchy. It is in this way that
norms and status are effective regulators of behavior. Those who
comply with the relevant norms, or enforce them, are rewarded
28 See Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context at 140, 148 (cited in note 11). Nissenbaum's
influential theory of "contextual integrity" explains privacy violations as, in part,
practices that violate "context-relative informational norms," that is, norms "that are
specifically concerned with the flow of personal information-transmission,
communication, transfer, distribution, and dissemination-from one party to
another ..... Id.
' Although the term "norms" is sometimes used to refer to mere regularities, the
most common sense in the legal literature is "informal, decentralized obligations."
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 Mich L
Rev 338, 350 (1997).
3
See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 Colum L Rev 903, 907
(1996) ("[B]ehavior is pervasively a function of norms. . . .").
3
See McAdams, 96 Mich L Rev at 342 (cited in note 29); Richard H. McAdams,
Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race
Discrimination,108 Harv L Rev 1003, 1020 (1994).
32 See Sunstein, 96 Colum L Rev at 921-22 (cited in note 30) (discussing the
importance of social roles).
3 To take an obvious but trivial example, a person with a high status as a baseball
player arising from his or her skill at that particular sport may have low status on the
basketball court.
34 Cecilia L. Ridgeway, Social Status and Group Structure, in Michael A. Hogg and
R. Scott Tindale, eds, Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Group Processes 352,
352 (Blackwell 2002).
35 Id at 915-16, 963-64 (discussing how norms influence social behavior and
status).
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through approbation, 36 respect, selection for positions of
authority, or other benefits.37 Those who fail to follow the
appropriate norms are likewise punished through actions that
signal or contribute to lowered status, such as shaming the
target through open displays of disrespect or confrontation, 3 8
shunning the target, or distributing information about the
target's transgressions-that is, gossiping. 39
These sanctions and rewards work because people highly
value status and seek to maximize it whenever possible. 40
Although there is sometimes a tendency to think of status as a
vain and shallow concern, status determinations matter greatly
to individuals. Status is nothing less than the amount of respect
and esteem with which one is held by one's friends, neighbors,
co-workers, and community. Aside from whatever psychic
benefits it conveys, there are also more material benefits to high
status. The higher an individual's status within a particular
group, the more power and influence that person has over the
group's decisions. Individuals are thus greatly motivated to keep
their status as high as possible. 4 1
See Ellickson, Order Without Law at 236-37 (cited in note 15) (providing the
example of a letter to the editor of a newspaper praising a good Samaritan).
37 See Nir Halevy, et al, Status Conferral in Intergroup Social Dilemmas:
Behavioral Antecedents and Consequences of Prestigeand Dominance, 102 J Personality
& Soc Psych 351, 351 (2012).
3 Open confrontation or ostentatious signs of disapproval, such as audible sighing
or loudly complaining to a companion, are common techniques to discipline strangers,
such as persons who cut in line.
39 Gossip is a relatively cheap and easy means of norm enforcement. See Matthew
Feinberg, Joey T. Cheng, and Robb Willer, Gossip as an Effective and Low-Cost Form of
Punishment, 35 Behav & Brain Sci 25 (2012); Matthew Feinberg, et al, The Virtues of
Gossip: Reputational Information Sharing as Prosocial Behavior, 102 J Personality &
Soc Psych 1015 (2012). There are other ways norms are enforced, but they are less
common. See McAdams and Rasmusen, Norms in Law and Economics in Polinsky and
Shavell, eds, Handbook of Law and Economics, 1573, 1578 (cited in note 22) (noting that
alternative sanctions include boycotts, property destruction, and violence).
40 See McAdams, 96 Mich L Rev at 355 (cited in note 29). There are alternative
views. Eric Posner has argued that norm compliance is primarily a means of signaling
long-term reliability. See generally Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms (Harvard
2000). But see Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms, and
Economic Methodology, 110 Yale L J 625, 663-70 (2001). Richard Epstein has expressed
doubt that anyone will forgo a monetary reward for a status benefit. See Richard A.
Epstein, The Status-ProductionSideshow: Why the Antidiscrimination Laws Are Still a
Mistake, 108 Harv L Rev 1085, 1100-01 (1995).
41 See McAdams, 96 Mich L Rev at 355-56 (cited in note 29) (reviewing evidence
that people seek to increase esteem); Ridgeway, Social Status and Group Structure, in
Hogg and Tindale, eds, Social Psychology: Group Processes 352, 352 (cited in note 34) ("It
is striking how concerned people are about their status in the eyes of others.").
36
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That brings us back to privacy. Privacy norms restrict what
information
about individuals
can be
gathered
and
distributed 42-including
information about their compliance
with other norms. Any change to privacy norms can be just as
destabilizing as changes to behavioral norms themselves. If
privacy norms change, information about the extent to which an
individual observes the rules of a group could flow in ways it
never had before, with deleterious effects on that individual's
status. In particular, when privacy norms change, individuals
who fail to adapt to the new norms may lose the ability to
compartmentalize information about themselves, based on their
various social roles. Information about family life may bleed into
an employment setting, and vice versa.
Norm change of this sort would not be as problematic if
individuals could readily adapt to sudden shifts. But societies
sometimes change faster than people, because many individuals
are locked in to their existing beliefs and behaviors. As Jon
Elster has written, norms "have a grip on the mind." 43 That is
because norms are often internalized-embraced by an
individual to such a degree that they become part of that
person's self-identity.44 Individuals who follow an internalized
norm do so not because they worry about what others may
think, but because they believe themselves to be the sort of
person who follows the norm.4 5 The result is that individuals
self-enforce internalized norms and may be unable to stop. They
feel pride when they have followed or enforced such a norm and
guilt when they have deviated from it or tolerated a deviation. 46

See Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context at 3, 140 (cited in note 11).
4 Jon Elster, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order 100 (Cambridge 1989).
4 A person's identity includes all of the ways in which a person conceives of herself
and her relationship to the rest of the world; it includes not merely how an individual
defines herself, but what roles she performs and what groups she is a member of. See
Timothy J. Owens, Dawn T. Robinson, and Lynn Smith-Lovin, Three Faces of Identity,
36 Ann Rev Soc 477, 479-80 (2010).
' See id.
46 See McAdams and Rasmusen, Norms in Law and Economics, in Polinsky and
Shavell, eds, Handbook of Law and Economics 1573, 1580 (cited in note 22). See also
Yuval Feldman and Robert MacCoun, Some Well-Aged Wines for the "New Norms"
Bottles: Implications of Social Psychology for Law and Economics, in Francesco Parisi
and Vernon Smith, eds, The Law and Economics of Irrational Behavior 358, 378
(Stanford 2005) (citing "vast literatures" on internalization in psychology, containing
"robust empirical generalizations based on literally thousands of laboratory and field
studies").
42
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Indeed, internalization of a set of norms does more than
simply define who an individual is; it helps shape his or her
entire world-view. Internalizing a norm means plugging it into a
person's framework of beliefs about how the world works and
should work. That framework forms the basis for all of the
individual's perceptions of events, including their meaning. 47 A
challenge to an internalized norm is therefore not likely to be
seen as simply a proposal for an alternative organization of
society. It is more likely to be seen as a threat to society itself. 4 8
Nor can individuals caught in the midst of a norm transition
simply look the other way. Norms are the result of a group
effort; there is no such thing as going it alone. 49 The stability of
norm sets and status regimes is thus critically important to
those who benefit from them. The more widespread the
adherence to a particular norm, the stronger it is, which gives
those who prefer the norm a natural incentive to encourage its
adoption and maintain compliance. Similarly for status-the
more people who accord status in a particular way, the greater
(or lesser) the target's status will be, since status simply reflects
the collective judgment of a group or community.50 The
beginnings of a shift to an alternate set of norms, including
privacy norms, is itself a threat to the status of an individual
following the existing norms.5 '
4
See Dan M. Kahan, et al, Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining
the White-Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J Empirical Legal Stud 465, 498 (2007)
("Group membership, it has been shown, 'can affect how people process information
about nearly all categories of stimuli in the social world'. . . ."). Although Kahan, et al,
focused on group membership, the process of norm internalization is closely related. See
also Dan M. Kahan, et al, Fearof Democracy: A CulturalEvaluationof Sunstein on Risk,
119 Harv L Rev 1071, 1072 (2006) (describing the importance of cultural worldviews in
apprehending risk).
48 See Balkin, 106 Yale L J at 2331 (cited in note 15) ("The preservation of the
status of one's group is seen as the preservation of morality itself or at the very least of a
particularly upright way of life."); Boyden, 62 Ala L Rev at 132-33, 170-71 (cited in note
21).
49 See Michael Sauder, Freda Lynn, and Joel M. Podolny, Status: Insights from
OrganizationalSociology, 38 Ann Rev Soc 267, 273 (2012) ("A principle that appears
consistent across research areas in sociology is that deference cannot be seized by an
actor but rather is something that is awarded by others.").
5
See id.
51 See Louis A. Zurcher and David A. Snow, Collective Behavior: Social Movements,
in Morris Rosenberg and Ralph H. Turner, eds, Social Psychology: Sociological
Perspectives 447, 451 (1990) (citing researchers who "have argued that challenges to the
existence and prestige of the life style to which individuals are committed can render
those individuals candidates for participation in 'status politics' andlor 'status
crusades."').
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Privacy and Norm Cascades

There is another reason why changes in privacy norms can
provoke feelings of alarm. As noted above, social norms,
including privacy norms, provide both the substance and the
method for status determinations, and status is something
individuals hold dear. That alone is likely to make any
alteration to the existing norm regime fraught with peril. But
norm regimes under challenge also become incredibly unstable.
This means that, when a change does occur, it often occurs not
slowly and gradually, giving individuals some time to prepare,
but quickly and catastrophically.
The sudden nature of norm transitions is a result of the fact
that norms have both a group component and an individual
component. A norm's power depends both on the number of
group members that have adopted it, and thus enforce the norm
against others, and on the intrinsic benefit the norm provides to
the individual-for example, by matching more closely with that
individual's self-concept. Each person in deciding whether to
continue following an existing norm, or to change and follow a
new norm, must therefore weigh these components together. 52
The more people adhering to the norm, the greater the first
component is, until it becomes so large that it tips the scale even
for individuals who would otherwise prefer a different norm. 53
This phenomenon is one that has been widely studied in
other contexts, from the behavior of crowds, 54 to social decisionmaking,5 5 to technology markets.5 6 It arises in any iterated
decision-making process in which the outcome of previous
decisions affects the value of the current decision. In other
words, norm adoption belongs to a class of problems involving
what is sometimes called "positive feedback."5 7 All of these
52 See George A. Akerlof, Social Distance and
Social Decisions, 65 Econometrica
1005, 1006-07 (Sept 1997); Mark Granovetter, Threshold Models of Collective Behavior,

83 Am J Soc 1420, 1422-24 (1978).
53 See W. Brian Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy
21 (Michigan 1994) (analyzing choices with group and individual components).
'
See Granovetter, 83 Am J Soc at 1422 (cited in note 52).
* See Akerlof, 65 Econometrica at 1006-07 (cited in note 52).
5
See Arthur, Increasing Returns at 13 (cited in note 53); Mark A. Lemley and
David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 Cal L Rev 479,

491-93 (1998).
5
A related phenomenon widely discussed in the legal literature is "network
effects." See, for example, Lemley and McGowan, 86 Cal L Rev at 494-95 (cited in note
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phenomena have the same basic structure as the norm
transitions described above: an "internal" component, based on
the benefits individuals directly experience from choosing a
particular option, and an "external" component, based on the
benefit experienced from having chosen the same option as
others.5 8
Two somewhat counter-intuitive results follow from this
structure. First, a group can become "locked in" to a particular
selection even if many of its members would actually prefer a
different option, as long as the benefit received from making the
same choice as others is high enough. 59 At that point, the group
decision becomes extraordinarily stable; small disturbances will
not be able to dislodge the group from its choice because of the
large relative value of the "external" component.60 But the
second result is the exact opposite of lock-in. If preferences
change for whatever reason, some adopters may, despite the
costs of doing so, choose a different option. Each time a switch
occurs, it makes the external value of the old option lower and
thus less compelling, and the external value of the new option
becomes that much more attractive, potentially producing
additional switches. Past a certain point, a trickle of such
switches can become an avalanche.6 1 Thus, although norms and
other group decisions are resistant to change, when they do
change they change not gradually but in sudden waves. 62
This phenomenon goes by various names, including tipping,
cascades, and the bandwagon effect. 63 Whatever it is called, the
outcome is basically the same: collective decisions are very
stable until there is a large shift of some sort, at which point the
56).
See Arthur, Competing Technologies at 21 (cited in note 53).
See id.
59
6
See Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A GenerativeApproach
to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U Chi L Rev 1225, 1264 (1997) (describing simple models of
norm adoption suggest equilibrium difficult to displace); Bibb Latane, Dynamic Social
Impact: The Creation of Culture by Communication, 46 J Communication 13, 21-23
(1996); Natalie S. Glance and Bernardo A. Huberman, The Dynamics of Social
Dilemmas, Scientific American 76, 78 (Mar 1994).
6' See Picker, 64 U Chi L Rev at 1228 (cited in note 60); Glance and Huberman, The
Dynamics of Social Dilemmas, Scientific American at 78-79 (cited in note 60).
62 See McAdams and Rasmusen, Norms in Law and Economics, in Polinsky and
Shavell, eds, Handbook of Law and Economics 1573, 1586 (cited in note 22); McAdams,
96 Mich L Rev at 367-68 (cited in note 29).
63 See Ellickson, Evolution of Social Norms, in Hechter and Opp, eds, Social Norms
35, 51 (cited in note 22); Sunstein, 96 Colum L Rev at 912 (cited in note 30).
58
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situation becomes very unstable.64 As change courses through
the system, the potential exists for a rapid and nearly total shift
to a different state. The occurrence of a norm transition depends
on the collective result of innumerable individual decisions that
are difficult to measure. A widespread shift in internal
preferences could easily remain hidden, as individuals have an
incentive to hide the extent to which their preferences diverge
from the norm.65 This subsurface pressure makes norm
transitions, like avalanches, hard to predict. We can know when
the conditions are favorable for such an event, but not precisely
when, or even if, it will occur.66
Whatever the mechanism, adherents to an existing norm
regime are right to be worried about the potential for sudden
change as even a subset of community members begins adopting
new norms. The combination of heavy investment and
unpredictable cascades is not one conducive to calm reflection as
a norm regime is under stress. The frequency of privacy alarms
may reflect this fact.
C.

Uncertainty

A final contributor to the alarm that attends norm
transitions, including shifts in privacy norms, is the difficulty of
determining when one is underway and what the outcome of
such changes might be. There are two related problems. First,
norm transitions are only readily identifiable in retrospect; they
may be difficult or impossible to identify in the moment.67 That
is because it may be difficult to determine what the source of the
threat is. Threats to privacy can come from two different
directions: violators could be motivated by purely selfish reasons
to obtain or disclose information outside of accepted privacy

64 See P.J. Lamberson and Scott E. Page, Tipping Points, 7 Q J Pol Sci 175, 198
(2012). See also Ellickson, Evolution of Social Norms, in Hechter and Opp, eds, Social
Norms 35, 37 (cited in note 22).
6
See Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 Va
L Rev 1901, 1966 (2000).
* See Per Bak, Chao Tang, and Kurt Wiesenfeld, Self-Organized Criticality, 38
Physics Rev A 364, 373 (1988) (describing sandpile model in which, once system has
reached "criticality," small perturbations may randomly set off large cascades).
67 See Fiske, Interpersonal Stratification, in Fiske, Gilbert, and Lindzey, eds,
Handbook of Social Psychology 941, 941 (cited in note 24) ("When hierarchies remain
stable, no one heeds them much. When hierarchies change, people finally notice the
stratification that subtly structures their every social interaction.").
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norms; or some sort of underlying social change may undermine
the norms themselves. Technological developments can spur
either one. Technology could make it easier to invade privacy
without being detected, thus evading social sanctions that had
previously worked to control violations. Changes in technology
could also produce broad changes in society-in how individuals
communicate and in the information they share-that could
destabilize the existing privacy norm regime and lead to a
transition point.
However, individuals adhering to the current privacy norm
regime are particularly unlikely to recognize a transition in
progress; they are likely to see it as simply a series of violations.
This poses problems for both the privacy scholar and privacy
policymaker in attempting to determine how best to respond to
change. Status regimes are typically invisible to their
participants; individuals are rarely conscious of their own or
even others' status-related motivations. 68 No one thinks to himor herself, "My status is being threatened; that is why I'm so
upset about this." What they perceive instead are merely bad
actors, people who willfully disobey rules or arbitrarily attempt
to oppress others. Indeed, since internalized norms form a part
of a person's worldview, challenging those norms may seem
more akin to a challenge to reality-that is, the unquestionable
social order-that, if successful, could threaten chaos.6 9 The
response is likely to be, at the least, loud protests that norm
challengers are violating some sort of fundamental tenet of
society. In the privacy realm, the result is "privacy panics"forecasts of doom if the norm is not respected. 70
Second, even if a transition were correctly identified, there
would still remain enormous uncertainty about its potential
effects. It is impossible to peer through the curtain of the future
to determine how new norms will be integrated into the existing
set of norms, and whose status will benefit most, or least, from
the change. All that can be said with certainty in advance is that
the new regime will be different from the current regime, where

See Ellickson, Order Without Law at 117-19 (cited in note 15).
6 See Kahan, et al, 4 J Empirical Legal Stud at 498 (cited in note 47)
("[IIndividuals' identities are threatened when they encounter information that
challenges beliefs commonly held within their group."); Balkin, 106 Yale L J at 2331
(cited in note 15).
7o See Barbas, 61 DePaul L Rev at 973 (cited in note
19).
6

188

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2013

the norm beneficiaries are already doing relatively well. It is
little wonder, then, that challenges to a norm regime, and in
particular to norms governing status, are typically met with
trepidation and alarm.7 1 Not only is it typically unclear how
individuals will fare on the other side, after the shift is complete,
it is often unclear to the beneficiaries of the current norm regime
whether there even is another side. 72 It is that sense of
impending collapse that drives the "end of" or "death of"
rhetoric.
II. 1890 AND THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVACY LAW
As the previous section demonstrated, our view of the
present is clouded by our presence in the present. It is difficult,
if not impossible, to distinguish external threats to current norm
structures-structures that we are all embedded in-from
changes to those structures. It is easier to recognize such a
distinction in a historical example, where the changes are now
complete.
One clear example of a change in privacy law being driven
by changing norms lies at the origins of privacy law in 1890 with
the publication of Warren and Brandeis's foundational article,
The Right to Privacy.73 Warren and Brandeis understood
themselves to be responding to new sources of privacy violations:
the sensationalist press known as "yellow journalism," as well as
reporters bearing the newfangled invention, the pocket
camera. 74 But the historical context reveals something far more
profound was underway. American society was undergoing a
fundamental transformation from locality-based communities to
associational groups as the basic unit of society.

n See, for example, John G. Turner and Katherine J. Reynolds, The Social Identity
Perspective in Intergroup Relations: Theories, Themes, and Controversies, in Rupert
Brown and Sam Gaertner, ed, Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Intergroup
Processes 133, 140 (Blackwell 2002) ("A high status group with positive social identity
which perceives its superiority as legitimate but unstable and under threat may be
highly discriminatory.").
7' An uncertain dynamic environment can be perilous for those at the top. See
George G. Szpiro, The Emergence of Risk Aversion, 2 Complexity 31, 35-36 (1997)
(finding that, in conditions of uncertainty, automata that seek only to maximize fitness
are wiped out).
1
See generally Warren and Brandeis, 4 Harv L Rev 193 (cited in note 16).
"

See id at 196.
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What emerged was the modern notion of individuals
inhabiting separate and distinct roles among multiple groups,
each with its attendant status determinations. This in turn
created a need to restrict the distribution of information
between groups, in order to maintain the boundaries between
roles. Far from a new threat to privacy emerging in the late
nineteenth century, it was a new need for privacy that arose.
The late nineteenth century saw the creation of the norms of
privacy that we are familiar with today-norms that are
perhaps entering their twilight.
A.

The Puzzle of Warren and Brandeis: Why 1890?

In December 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis
published their famous article calling for the recognition of a
common law right of privacy.75 Most histories of privacy law
take the publication of The Right to Privacy as their departure
point, dating the concept from that moment.76 Warren and
Brandeis's article has been enormously influential, spawning
recognition of new common law torts in several states, and even
a constitutional right of privacy that ultimately has had a much
greater practical impact.77 Warren and Brandeis appear to have
successfully captured an emerging zeitgeist with their article,
tapping into some nascent sense in 1890 that privacy was not
only under attack, but also required specific legal protections.78
But the success of the article raises a puzzle: why had it not
occurred earlier? Why were conditions ripe for the concept of
privacy law only in 1890? Privacy had antecedents that
stretched back centuries; even the specific complaints made by
Warren and Brandeis had been made by others decades before.7 9
Id.
There is a substantial literature on the intellectual history of the article. See, for
example, Barbas, 61 DePaul L Rev at 979-83 (cited in note 19); David W. Leebron, The
Right to Privacy's Place in the Intellectual History of Tort Law, 41 Case W Res L Rev 769,
769 (1991). See generally Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21
Ariz L Rev 1 (1979).
7
See, for example, Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479, 510 n 1 (1965) (Black, J,
dissenting) (tracing origin of constitutional right to privacy to Warren and Brandeis
article); Leebron, 41 Case W Res L Rev at 802 (cited in note 76) (same).
7
Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis L Rev 1335, 1353 (1992)
("It seems fair to say that if Warren and Brandeis had not invented a right of privacy in
December of 1890, somebody else would have had to invent a similar legal concept, by
whatever name, in short order.").
79 See text accompanying notes 86-87; Lawrence M. Friedman, Guarding Life's
7
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Legal scholars have only briefly addressed what changes in
the years leading up to 1890 might have suddenly made a
specific tort remedy for privacy attractive. For the most part,
they have offered relatively simple causal explanations. For
example, it has been suggested that population growth,
urbanization, industrialization, or technological improvements
in communications and transportation may have created the
need for legal protection of privacy.8 0 The precipitating factor
most commonly cited is the emergence of so-called "yellow
journalism," with its banner headlines and sensationalism in
covering the news.8 1
None of the commonly cited explanations is entirely
satisfactory. For one thing, the timing is off. All of the proposed
causal factors predate The Right to Privacy by half a century or
more. The electric telegraph was invented in the 1840s; at
around the same time, railroads drastically reduced the time it
took to move persons and freight, and canals had done so two
decades before. 82 Urbanization had been occurring since at least
the middle of the nineteenth century, as had population growth,
as young Americans and immigrants sought their fortunes in
the growing metropolises. 8 3 In any event, far from creating a
need for privacy, urbanization may have actually increased

Dark Secrets: Legal and Social Controls Over Reputation, Propriety, and Privacy
(Stanford 2007) (discussing how privacy is protected by defamation law); Neil M.
Richards and Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering the Law of
Confidentiality, 96 Georgetown L J 123, 125-26 (2007) (discussing how confidentiality
was protected under Anglo-American law). See generally Harvard Law Review, Note,
The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 Harv L Rev 1892 (1981)
(discussing how privacy is protected under law of contract, trespass, defamation, and
breach of confidence). For earlier privacy protections, see generally David H. Flaherty,
Privacy in Colonial New England 113-27, 164-241 (Virginia 1972).
8 See Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and
Social Change, 1890-1990, 80 Cal L Rev 1133, 1137 (1992); Benjamin E. Bratman,
Brandeis and Warren's The Right to Privacy and the Birth of the Right to Privacy, 69
Tenn L Rev 623, 644 (2002); Glancy, 21 Ariz L Rev at 7 (cited in note 76); Don R.
Pember, Privacy and the Press: The Law, the Mass Media, and the First Amendment 15
(Washington 1972).
s' See, for example, Glancy, 21 Ariz L Rev at 10 (cited in note 76).
82 See Menahem Blondheim, News over the Wires: The Telegraph and the Flow of
Public Information in America, 1844-1897 11 (Harvard 1994) (describing how telegraph
increased speed of information); David T.Z. Mindich, Just the Facts: How "Objectivity"
Came to Define American Journalism 108 (NYU 1998) (describing improvements in
telegraph, railroads, and canals).
m See generally Karen Halttunen, Confidence Men and Painted Women: A Study of
Middle-Class Culture in America, 1830-1870 (Yale 1982).
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privacy in nineteenth-century America, as individuals moved
away from the prying eyes of small towns. 84
Even the sensationalism of the late-nineteenth-century
penny press was far from a novel development. The first penny
press upended the newspaper industry in the 1830s; like its
later cousin, the 1830s penny press was the result of
technological improvements in newspaper publishing that
lowered the cost of publishing and led to wide-ranging changes
in news coverage, including the first society gossip items.8 5 The
1830s elites were no more enamored of press coverage than
Warren and Brandeis would be a half-century later. As early as
1838, James Fenimore Cooper was complaining about the
intrusiveness of the penny press: "The press tyrannizes over
publick men, letters, the arts, the stage, and even over private
life. Under the pretence of protecting public morals, it is
corrupting them to the core."8 6 In 1840, an attendee at a society
ball noted the presence of a reporter from the New York Herald
and ruefully remarked that being forced "to submit to this kind
of surveillance [was] getting to be intolerable."8 7
Warren and Brandeis themselves are of limited assistance
in identifying what it was that had changed. Like many modern
commentators, they identified the source of the problem they
were trying to address as "[r]ecent inventions and business
methods"-specifically "[i]nstantaneous photographs and [the]
newspaper enterprise"-which "ha[d] invaded the sacred
precincts of private and domestic life."88 "[N]umerous
mechanical devices," Warren and Brandeis warned darkly,
"threaten to make good the prediction that 'what is whispered in

84 See Flaherty, Privacy in Colonial New England at 92 (cited in note 79) ('The
surveillance powers of neighbors were indisputable."); Pember, Privacy and the Press at
8 (cited in note 80), quoting Edward Shils, Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31
L & Contemp Probs 281, 299 (1966).
8
See Schudson, Discovering the News at 28-29, 49-50 (cited in note 17).
Schudson's book is the standard work on the evolution of newspapers in the nineteenth
century.
James Fenimore Cooper, The American Democrat, or Hints on the Social and
Civil Relations of the Unites States of America 131 (H & E Phinney 1838).
8
Schudson, Discoveringthe News at 28 (cited in note 17).
Warren and Brandeis, 4 Harv L Rev at 195 (cited in note 16). See also Amy
Gajda, What If Samuel D. Warren Hadn't Marrieda Senator's Daughter?: Uncovering the
Press Coverage that Led to "The Right to Privacy", 2008 Mich St L Rev 35, 43-44 (2008);
Robert E. Mensel, 'Kodakers Lying in Wait" Amateur Photography and the Right of
Privacy in New York, 1885-1915, 43 Am Q 24, 29 (1991).
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the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops."' 89 While
Warren's wife's family had been the subject of intrusive press
coverage, 90 the descriptions of the press in The Right to Privacy
verge on the hyperbolic. 9 1 And the remedy Warren and Brandeis
proposed seems extreme to modern sensibilities: a "far-reaching"
protection of "the right to an inviolate personality," entailing not
only a person's right "to prevent his public portraiture," but also
a "right to protect one's self from pen portraiture, [that is,] from
a discussion by the press of one's private affairs." 92 Even a
written description of a person would give rise to liability.9 3
Indeed, Warren and Brandeis were confident that publication of
the contents of a person's jewelry collection could be
prohibited. 94 It seems clear that Warren and Brandeis were
writing immediately before, or perhaps during, some sort of
transition in norms, one that made the idea of privacy in a list of
jewels pass from unquestionable to far-fetched.
B.

The Anxiety of the Gilded Age

The shift that led to the Warren and Brandeis article began
decades before. The mid-nineteenth century was undeniably a
time of vast upheaval in American society. The visible signs of

8 Warren and Brandeis, 4 Harv L Rev at 195 (cited in note 16). Aside from the
camera, it is not entirely clear what other mechanical devices Warren and Brandeis may
have had in mind, but elsewhere they referred to "any other modern device for recording
or reproducing scenes or sounds," indicating that they foresaw the telephone and the
phonograph becoming problematic as well. Id at 206.
9 The definitive article on the subject is Gajda, 2008 Mich St L Rev 35 (cited in note
88). For decades, the legal literature accepted William Prosser's claim, apparently made
without evidence, that Warren was inspired to write the article after intrusive coverage
of his daughter's wedding. See James H. Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 Suffolk U L
Rev 875, 891-93 (1979). That account has been decisively rejected, see id at 896-97, but
the story continues to be repeated. See Gajda, 2008 Mich St L Rev at 38 n 12 (cited in
note 88) (citing various sources repeating this account).
91 See Pember, Privacy and the Press at 39-40 (cited in note 80). For example,
Warren and Brandeis claimed that "[t]o satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual
relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily papers," which seems unlikely.
Warren and Brandeis, 4 Harv L Rev at 196 (cited in note 16).
92 Warren and Brandeis, 4 Harv L Rev at 211, 213 (cited in note 16). Warren and
Brandeis even proposed criminal sanctions for violations of privacy. See id at 219.
93 See id at 214. The one significant exception Warren and Brandeis allowed was for
"publication of matter which is of public or general interest" with "public or general
interest" defined narrowly as concerning, for example, "fitness for a public office." Id at
216.
9
Id at 203.
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change were everywhere. Railroads crisscrossed the country,
opening up the ability to trade in distant markets.9 5 Telegraph
lines cut the time it took to transmit a message from Boston to
Philadelphia from days to seconds. 96 Cities swelled with
migrants from the farm and immigrants from abroad.9 7
Businesses became big, and their owners made vast fortunes
that created a new elite overnight.98
But the change that led to the creation of privacy law was
both more subtle and more profound than any of these. The
economic and technological improvements that began about midcentury fundamentally altered social relations in the United
States. 99 The ease of communicating and transacting business at
a distance slowly transformed American society from one that
was dominated by local communities, each with its own social
structure and status hierarchy, to one that was dominated
instead by groups and hierarchies that transcended localities.
Individuals went from having a single defined place in an
isolated small town to playing numerous roles in various
organizations: business enterprises, professional associations,
religious denominations, labor unions, fraternal organizations,
educational institutions, families, reform groups, political
parties, and more.
The emergence of separately assessed roles required the
creation of something new: limits on the appropriateness of
sharing of information about individuals across group
boundaries. Without such rules, it might become impossible to
keep roles distinct, as information about a person's activities in
one context bled into other contexts. The economic and social
transformations of the late nineteenth century, in other words,
demanded the creation of our modern notions of privacy. But at
the same time, the rise of mass media in its modern form was
making cabining information more difficult. It was this
95 See George Rogers Taylor, The TransportationRevolution, 1815-1860 151-52
(Rinehart 1951).
96 See Blondheim, News over the Wires at 11 (cited in note 82); Daniel Walker Howe,
What Hath God Wrought: The Transformationof America, 1815-1848 696 (Oxford 2007).
9
See Halttunen, Confidence Men and Painted Women at 35 (cited in note 83);
Howe, What Hath God Wrought at 826 (cited in note 96).
9
See Alfred D. Chandler Jr, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in
American Business 237 (Belknap 1977); Sven Beckert, The Monied Metropolis: New York
City and the Consolidation of the American Bourgeoisie, 1850-1896 4-5 (Cambridge
2001).
99 This claim is elaborated below in Section II.B.2.
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challenge that spurred Warren and Brandeis to write their
famous article.
1.

Precursor to change: the collapse of the island
communities.

Until the mid-1870s, as historian Robert Wiebe observed
long ago, "[simall-town life was America's norm." 0 0 The threads
connecting localities to rnetropoles were for most of that time
still too attenuated to bind them together. Instead, the isolated
populations formed archipelagoes of what Wiebe called "island
communities," towns that, while sometimes associated with a
larger regional center, nevertheless "retain[ed] the sense of
living largely to themselves."1 0 1 In those towns, social status was
determined by stable and tight-knit groups, by members of the
community who were able to observe a person's behavior over a
long period of time. A single set of norms governed all aspects of
life-religious devotion, family life, skill at one's occupation,
personal interactions, adherence to social norms, wealth, racial
or ethnic heritage. 102 Members of the island communities
interacted with each other frequently, no matter what their
status, and thus there were regular opportunities for everyone
in the town to assess each other's behavior and make status
determinations. Even the elites in places such as New York City
would engage in ritualized exercises of public display, for
example taking regular promenades where they could see and be
seen by their neighbors of all social strata. 103
Throughout the nineteenth century, as technology improved
and the pace of industrialization increased, goods moved to more
distant markets, and information flowed more easily between
communities.104 But for most of the century these interactions
were limited. Few national or even regional institutions,
organizations, or social relations intruded upon the island
100 See Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920
2 (Hill and Wang 1967).
101 Id at 2, 44.
10
See id at 133 ("Year after year townspeople watched each other labor and idle,
save and spend, help and cheat, attend church and frequent saloons.. .. [T]hey judged
their neighbors with a clear conscience, and . .. a single standard had generally sufficed
for all."); Thomas Bender, Community and Social Change in America 118 (Rutgers 1978)
(stating that different social roles "were once mutually reinforcing and collectively
constituted a community").
103 See Beckert, The Monied Metropolis
at 2 (cited in note 98).
104 See Howe, What Hath God Wrought
at 564-65 (cited in note 96).
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communities.1 0 5 There was little in the way of government
bureaucracy, and there were few regional offices for distant
businesses, no professional organizations, and no unions. Few
social structures of any kind tied the affairs of an island
community to distant city centers or imposed constraints on the
status determinations that the members of the community could
make.10 6 It was not that members of an island community could
expect privacy from each other; far from it. It was that they
knew what to expect.
All of that began to crumble away, slowly, beginning in the
1870s. Many of the developments identified by legal scholars as
producing the Warren and Brandeis article played a role in that
shift: business expansion, migration, the new urban middle
class, and the rise of mass-market newspapers. 0 7 Although they
did not directly produce the privacy crisis of the 1890s, they
contributed to the transformation that did: each of these
phenomena gradually undermined the authority of social
hierarchies in small towns and villages, creating space for a new
form of community, one centered on groups based on social roles.
The expansion of businesses had a profound effect on latenineteenth-century America. In the early part of the nineteenth
century, businesses in the United States were small, family-run
affairs. 108 But beginning in about the 1830s, improvements in
transportation-roads and canals-and communications-the
telegraph-led to an expansion of market connections.1 0 9 Once
suppliers no longer needed to be located near where they
ultimately sold their goods, a national market emerged, one that
transformed not just commercial transactions but society as
well. 10 New social links were created between producers and

105
106

See Wiebe, Search for Order at 2 (cited in note 100).
See id at 113, 133; Bender, Community and Social Change at 61 (cited in note

102).
107
For discussion of the causes of the Warren and Brandeis article, see the sources
cited above in notes 80-81.
1os See Chandler, The Visible Hand at 40 (cited in note 98) (Until the 1840s, both
commerce and production "remained small and personal."). See also Wiebe, Search for
Order at 19-21 (cited in note 100).
109
See Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846 4144 (Oxford 1991). There is some debate over the extent to which social change occurred
before 1850. See Daniel Feller, The Market Revolution Ate My Homework, 25 Rev Am
Hist 408, 408-09 (1997).
110
See Howe, What Hath God Wrought at 565 (cited in note 96); Wiebe, Search for
Order at 48-49 (cited in note 100).
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purchasers dispersed throughout the country, and a common
consumer culture began to coalesce."' The variations of isolated
localities were smoothed out.
In order to govern such far-flung empires, businesses
themselves had to change. One such transformation was due to
the rise of the corporate form, but the truly revolutionary
innovation was the development of tiered organization and the
subsequent rise of middle managers. 112 Tiered organization
allowed
distribution
of
management
decision-making
throughout a large company by putting some employees in
charge of discrete units, such as regional offices or task-specific
departments. This development not only allowed businesses to
balloon to gargantuan size, but it also had an important social
ramification: it created a new social network, the network of
middle managers, clerks, and other office workers necessary to
run a large enterprise.11 3
Those middle managers joined entrepreneurs profiting from
the growing market economy to form a new urban middle class.
The rise of this new middle class had a disruptive effect on the
existing social order. They struggled to define their place in
existing social hierarchies by asserting the same entitlement to
high status as the older mercantile and landed elite, leading to
conflicts over measures of distinction.114 The managers and
entrepreneurs were joined in this effort by an emerging group of
professionals-doctors,
lawyers,
teachers,
accountants,
architects, and others-workers that sought to distinguish the
worth of their skills and their services by defining a professional
identity and a minimum set of qualifications." 5 Warren and
Brandeis, who graduated from Harvard Law School in 1878,
were the product of this process, being among the first classes to
graduate from Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell's modern
legal school curriculum.
Urbanization also attracted young adults from the
hinterlands to try their fortunes in the cities. The prevailing
norms in urban environments were quite different than those of

"' See T.J. Jackson Lears, No Place of Grace: Antimodernism
Transformation of American Culture, 1880-1920 9 (Pantheon 1981).
112 Chandler, The Visible Hand at 7-10 (cited
in note 98).
113 Id at
38.
114 See Beckert, Monied Metropolis at 246--47
(cited in note 98).
115 See id at 253-54; Wiebe, Search for Order at 113 (cited in note 100).
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isolated communities.1 1 6 But even more threatening to
community norms was the very act of migration itself, which
became increasingly common as transportation improved. As
individuals continued to migrate into cities and westward, the
social hierarchies and status regimes of the rural towns lost
their hold on them. Migration effectively cut off an individual's
history, making past compliance with a norm regime irrelevant
and past deviance untraceable."'
Finally, there was the emergence of mass-market
newspapers, beginning with the first penny press in the
1830s.118 Editors in the 1830s were the first to realize that they
could boost circulation and make higher profits by dropping the
price of their newspapers. The key was including material the
new urban middle class would be interested in reading. Not only
did the first penny press essentially invent the modern
newspaper, it also helped to define a new sort of community.119
The very act of learning what is happening in a distant location
makes the events occurring there seem more relevant to one's
life, and as historian Thomas Haskell has argued, can create a
sense of empathetic connection. 120 The penny press, merely by
reporting on events in other towns and cities, knit those
localities together. 121 To the consternation of the existing elite,
the penny press's reporting of society gossip had a similar

effect.12 2
As a result of these developments, by the 1870s, the localitybased "island communities" were coming apart at the seams.
Their elites found their control over norm enforcement and
See generally Halttunen, Confidence Men and Painted Women (cited in note 83).
n' See Friedman, GuardingLife's Dark Secrets at 28-29 (cited in note 79).
118 The old penny press of the 1830s, due to inflation, cost about four to six cents per
issue in the 1870s. Revolutions in printing and in the newspaper business allowed some
publishers to again drop the price in the 1870s, permitting them to reach a broader
audience.
u9 As Richard D. Brown has noted, improvements in nineteenth-century
communications eliminated the power of local elites to act as "information gatekeepers
for their neighbors." Richard D. Brown, Knowledge Is Power: The Diffusion of
Information in EarlyAmerica, 1700-1865 294 (Oxford 1989).
120
See Thomas L. Haskell, Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitarian
Sensibility, Part 2, 90 Am Hist Rev 547, 551 (1985) (noting that the market encourages
participants to "attend to the remote consequences of their actions").
121 For the role of newspapers in defining a society, see generally Benedict Anderson,
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Verso rev
116

ed 2006).
122

See Schudson, Discoveringthe News at 28-30 (cited in note 17).
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status determinations steadily slipping away. 123 Traditional
norms of deference to family elders weakened, 124 and a wave of
scandals engulfed prominent figures. 125 Economic activity
frequently depended on decisions made elsewhere; specialization
required increased reliance on others; social and professional
networks for individuals were more and more extending outside
of a given town or city. 1 2 6 As roles split apart, the sorts of
behavior appropriate in each sphere became more difficult to
identify. Relations with family and friends became sharply
different from other social relations, leading to painful
adjustments for adherents of the old order.127
2.

The rise of the segmented society.

As the isolated communities faded, a new form of
community rose to take its place. The new community ties were
based on the segmentation of the various spheres of life, such as
public and private. As historian Thomas Bender described the
shift: "Work, once securely plated in the context of family and
locality, became separated from its traditional social context.
Whereas work, family, and town once supplied mutually
reinforcing personal orientations, they became crosscutting
sources of identity in the bifurcated society that emerged in the
late nineteenth century."12 8 Sociologists and historians have long
referred to this transition as the movement from gemeinschaft to

123See Beckert, Monied Metropolis at 325 (cited in note 98).
See Halttunen, Confidence Men and Painted Women at 13 (cited in note 83) ("As
the ties between family generations weakened and as traditional controls over young
workingmen declined, older patterns of social deference were giving way to the new
significance of relations between peers.").
121 See Friedman, Guarding Life's Dark Secrets at 28-29 (cited in note 79). See
generally Altina Waller, Reverend Beecher and Mrs. Tilton: Sex and Class in Victorian
America (Massachusetts 1982).
126See Wiebe, Search for Order at 49 (cited in note 100) ("Neither merchant nor
farmer could borrow on an informal basis as he once might have, nor could he expect his
reputation or his glib tongue to win a personal extension."); Lears, No Place of Grace at
34 (cited in note 111) ("As market relations spread, they undermined individual
autonomy and promoted social interdependence."); Bender, Community and Social
Change at 108 (cited in note 102) ("Growth in the size and complexity of local life
combined with important losses in local autonomy encouraged people to identify
community with certain of its parts rather than with the whole, and for a few precocious
individuals, social networks completely independent of territory defined a new kind of
community.").
127 Bender, Community and Social Change at 117 (cited in note 102).
124

12

Id at 108, 114.
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gesellschaft, from "community" to "society." 129 What emerged
from the transition were the beginnings of a recognizably
modern society.
The key to this new form of community was the emergence
of separate roles, each with its own set of statuses and norms
that were enforced by different groups. 130 Groups of all sorts
separated away from their local communities to form their own
ties. Elites began forming social networks that connected with
elites in other cities, using institutions that extended nationwide
such as corporate boards, fraternal organizations, elite colleges,
and boarding schools. 131 Indeed, Americans of all stripes began
self-consciously associating with others of their "class": The
middle class joined professional organizations. Laborers joined
unions. Each subset of society participated in their own leisure
activities, attended their own cultural events, and joined their
own organizations. 13 2 By 1890, the transition was complete, with
William James noting that "a man has as many social selves as
there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of
him in their mind." 33
The new system, however, was prone to a novel threat, one
that had not been an issue in the old island communities where
everyone knew everything. The waning influence of localitybased communities made control of a person's outward image
both more critical and more difficult, because information about
individuals was increasingly in the hands of people beyond a
person's immediate social circle. It required the development of
norms that protected one's ability to maintain separate
identities in different contexts: work tasks, family tasks, social
Id at 116-17. The terms were coined by sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies in 1887.
See generally Ferdinand Tonnies, Community and Society (Harper & Row 1963) (Charles
P. Loomis, ed and trans). As Bender has argued, it would be more accurate to describe
the shift not as from community to something else, but from one form of community to
another. See Bender, Community and Social Change at 58 (cited in note 102).
130 See Bender, Community and Social Change at 118 (cited in note 102) (explaining
the emergence of separately evaluated roles).
131 See Beckert, Monied Metropolis at 239-40 (cited in note 98); Lawrence W. Levine,
Highbrow/Lowbrow: The Emergence of CulturalHierarchy in America 206-08 (Harvard
1988).
132
See Wiebe, Search for Order at 111 (cited in note 100). For the battles over social
and cultural events, see Levine, Highbrow/Lowbrow at 206-08 (cited in note 131);
Beckert, Monied Metropolis at 2, 146-47 (cited in note 98).
133 William James, The Principles of Psychology 294 (Henry Holt 1890). James
continued: "Many a youth who is demure enough before his parents and teachers, swears
and swaggers like a pirate among his 'tough' young friends."
129

200

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2013

relations, religious observance, public activities, and particularly
the home, which was believed to be a necessary respite from the
crushing "overpressure" of modern life. 134 The boundaries
between these separate identities could not be maintained if
information flowed freely between contexts.
3.

The dawn of modern privacy.

Slowly, in the late nineteenth century, a response emerged
to the threat posed by information flows to the rising
associational communities. The response was the development of
modern notions of privacy-our notions of privacy, under which
employers are not supposed to know about family life, business
dealings are distinct from political discussions, religious
activities are not informed by behavior at sporting events and
bars, and interactions with government officials are separate
from all of these. Such restrictions are a necessary concomitant
of the rise of separate social roles produced by the
transformation of the 1870s. And privacy law was developed to
help enforce this new set of norms when social sanctions proved
insufficient.
As Warren and Brandeis themselves made clear, the
"modern enterprise and invention" they worried most about was
the newspaper industry.' 3 5 The newspaper industry was at that
time in the midst of yet another transformation, the rise of the
second penny press. The second penny press must have
appeared particularly destabilizing to Warren, Brandeis, and
their cohorts. It was not merely that some papers had dropped
their prices to a penny to boost circulation, or that they covered
society gossip. All of that had occurred before, in the 1830s.
What was different in the 1890s was the audience that
newspapers could now reach, and upon whom they relied for
their massive circulations. 13 6 The old penny press had been
revolutionary in its day because the drop in price allowed the

':u See Lears, No Place of Grace at 52 (cited in note 111) (describing the perceived
importance of maintaining the separateness of the home); Bender, Community and
Social Change at 61 (cited in note 102) ("Modern urban society is a social aggregate in
which different activities, ranging from worship and play to work and politics, each
generate or occur within different networks of social interaction. Each of these also
provides a reference group that forms a portion of modern man's identity.").
135 Warren and Brandeis, 4 Harv L Rev at 196 (cited in note 16).
136 See Schudson, Discovering the News at 89-90 (cited in note 17).
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rising entrepreneurial middle class to purchase the newspaper,
and the content of the penny press reflected that class's interest
in local and distant news. The new penny press lowered prices to
the point where a daily newspaper was affordable even to
laborers. By the turn of the century, almost everyone read a
newspaper.137
It was not simply the price that induced the working class
to begin purchasing newspapers; the content was aimed to draw
in a wider audience as well, and with it the advertisers who pay
to reach such an audience. The 1890s penny press put in
illustrations to appeal to immigrants from southern and Eastern
Europe, 138 large headlines to appeal to commuters, and
advertisements and tips to appeal to consumers, particularly
middle-class women. 139 Above all, the penny papers developed
content that their immigrant, laborer, harried middle-class
commuter, and domestic consumer audience would pay to readcompelling narratives about interesting events, in preference to
information-laden reports about important events. It was these
techniques that were labeled "sensationalism," meaning the use
of attention-getting techniques to draw attention to local crime
news, scandal, and high society coverage-news items that
appeared in most papers at the time, but were promoted most
heavily in the new penny press. 140
The broad distribution of scandal and gossip was
threatening to the emerging social order. The new social world of
the 1890s depended crucially on the construction of role-specific
presentations of one's outward image. That in turn depended on
limiting the flow of inappropriate or unexpected information
between contexts. The social norms governing such flows were
being constructed for the first time in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century, just as the new penny papers, with their
obtrusive coverage of crime, scandal, and the rich and famous,
were achieving success with mass circulation. The result was
137 See
Richard L. Kaplan, From Partisanship to Professionalism: The
Transformationof the Daily Press,in 4 Carl F. Kaestle and Janice A. Radway, eds, Print
in Motion: The Expansion of Publishingand Reading in the United States, 1880-1940 at
116, 120 (North Carolina 2009).
1 See Schudson, Discovering the News at 97 (cited in note 17). By 1890, immigrants
comprised 40 percent of New York City's population. See id.
139 See id at 100.
140 See id at 95; Kaplan, From Partisanshipto Professionalismat 124 (cited in note
137).
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that gossip could not be contained within particular peer groups,
but, through newspapers, could escape those boundaries-to
laborers at a time when class tensions were high, to immigrants
at a time when anti-immigrant sentiment was widespread, and
to women at a time when middle-class women were increasingly
being sequestered to particular domestic roles. 141 The penny
papers were also distributing images of the elite as well, at first
in the form of illustrations, but soon after by reproduction of
photographs. Prior to the widespread use of illustrations in
newspapers, only a close associate would have regular access to
one's appearance. And the new penny papers threatened to
broadcast this information-gossip and illustrations-not just
within a particular city, but outside of it as well; indeed, the
major newspapers were expanding their distribution to deliver
content on a national scale. 142 Such widespread dissemination
threatened to undermine the fragile norms separating social
contexts that were then under construction. 143
Warren and Brandeis are sometimes derided for their fear
of the spread of gossip. 1 4 4 But in fact gossip is a critically
important source of social information that has legitimate as
well as illegitimate uses.14 5 The battle that led to the emergence
For a historiographical overview, see generally Linda K. Kerber, Separate
Spheres, Female Worlds, Woman's Place: The Rhetoric of Women's History, 75 J Am Hist
9 (1988).
142 This helps to explain why Warren may have been particularly
bothered by the
reports uncovered by Amy Gajda in newspapers from New York and Washington. See
Gajda, 2008 Mich St L Rev at 44-57 (cited in note 88). However, Boston papers were, as
Edward Pember concluded, relatively staid. See Pember, Privacy and the Press at 40
(cited in note 80).
143 It is likely no accident that this turmoil erupted as the United States was dealing
with a surge of migrants and immigrants swelling the cities. Increasing ties between
networks can actually destabilize those networks, whether social networks, see
Ellickson, Evolution of Social Norms, in Hechter and Opp, eds, Social Norms 35, 37
(cited in note 22), or physical networks, see Marten Scheffer, et al, Anticipating Critical
Transitions, 338 Science 344, 344-45 (Oct 19, 2012); Charles D. Brummitt, Raissa M.
D'Souza, and E.A. Leicht, Suppressing Cascades of Load in Interdependent Networks,
109 Proc Natl Acad Sci E680, E683-84 (2012) (finding that, past a certain point,
interconnectivity between electrical grids makes them subject to larger cascades).
144 See, for example, Stewart Baker, Skating on Stilts: Why We Aren't Stopping
Tomorrow's Terrorism 311 (Hoover Institution 2010) ("What's remarkable about 'The
Right to Privacy' is that the article's title still invokes reverence, even though its
substance is, well, laughable.").
1'
See Ellickson, Order Without Law at 214-15, 232-33 (cited in note 15); C. Edwin
Baker, Autonomy and Informational Privacy, or Gossip: The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment, 21 Soc Phil & Pol 215, 260-67 (2004) (explaining that gossip serves a smallscale political purpose); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to
Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 Cornell L Rev 291, 326-37 (1983) ("[G]ossip is a
141
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of privacy law was a battle over the rules of distributing such
powerful information.146 That battle erupted just as new group
boundaries were taking form and solidifying, in particular the
boundaries
between
classes.147
Widespread
newspaper
readership threatened that nascent structure by allowing the
lower classes "to be in proximity to the mighty, the famous, the
glorious, the authoritative, and to derogate them at the same
time."148
The irony of the Warren and Brandeis article is that, while
it essentially invented the modern concept of legally protecting
separately defined roles, the particular legal remedy it proposed
was ultimately little used. By the second decade of the twentieth
century the specific privacy crisis that had alarmed Warren and
Brandeis eventually began to subside, as the new elites became
more familiar with mass media, and more adept at exploiting or
avoiding it. Thus, despite an initially warm reception, 149 the
effort to establish a broad privacy right fell short of the mark
that Warren and Brandeis, in The Right to Privacy, had
identified. That is, The Right to Privacy did not lead to a legal
prohibition against, for example, describing a woman's
appearance, or listing the contents of a private collection, nor did
it inspire a criminal prohibition on invasions of privacy. The
most egregious intrusions-spying on someone in a secluded
place, using a person's image in advertising without consentwere ultimately prohibited, but little else.6 0
basic form of information exchange that teaches about other lifestyles and attitudes, and
through which community values are changed or reinforced.").
146
See Gajda, 2008 Mich St L Rev at 43 (cited in note 88) (noting that "[t]he word
gossip is used no fewer than five times in a single, key paragraph"), citing Warren and
Brandeis, 4 Harv L Rev at 214 (cited in note 16); Barron, 13 Suffolk U L Rev at 918
(cited in note 90) ("The patrician view held that news considered worthy of print was
made by public figures, not by ordinary people. Newspapers existed to serve the ends of
public policy, not to cater to the mass tastes of the general public.").
147
See Beckert, Monied Metropolis at 273 (cited in note 98).
14s Shils, 31 L & Contemp Probs at 293 (cited in note 84).
See also Barbas, 61
DePaul L Rev at 981 (cited in note 19) ("Unwanted publicity of private life was thus seen
as destructive of the social order because it disturbed the formalized rituals of selfpresentation and ruptured the strict boundaries between public and private life.").
Although privacy and status thus appear to be related, the idea that privacy is a means
to defend elite status was contested even in 1890. See Brook Thomas, The Construction of
Privacy in and Around '"The Bostonians",64 Am Lit 719, 723 (1992).
149 See Barbas, 61 DePaul L Rev at 985 (cited in note 19); Bratman, 69 Tenn L Rev
at 644-47 (cited in note 80).
15 Commentators have alternately viewed this result as a victory or a failure.
Compare Zimmerman, 68 Cornell L Rev at 365 (cited in note 145), with Neil M. Richards
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In 1890, that outcome was far from apparent. The ground
was shifting but it was unclear what the terrain would look like
when it stopped. Warren, Brandeis, and their contemporaries
were attempting to make the minimal changes possible; they
wanted to construct a world in which the new associational
communities were permitted to operate much like the isolated
communities had, as self-contained social units where the
participants in the norm regime were all members of the same
community with reciprocal obligations. That turned out not to be
possible, and while it was difficult to see why at the time, the
popular press appeared to be an exemplar of the problems of
replicating isolated communities in social groups. The sense of
crisis that produced The Right to Privacy was in part a sense of
anxiety brought about by the dark gloom of the future.
It is too easy to conclude that late nineteenth century elites
were atypical in their concern for their status or their inability
to foresee the course of future events. Their norms are not our
norms, and their statuses are not our statuses, and thus they
perhaps appear trifling. But it would folly to suppose we do not
have our own norms or statuses worth preserving, or that we are
better able to determine what will happen to them. Status
determinations need not be class-based; one's status as a nice
person, or a respected authority figure, is as much dependent on
norms of appropriate behavior as those of late nineteenth
century urban elites. And a threat to such statuses arising from
a modern privacy shift would be as keenly felt.
III. THE PRESENT SHIFT
The circumstances that give rise to Warren and Brandeis's
concerns-yellow journalism and the industrial revolution-are
now a distant memory. Even newspapers appear to be nearing
the end of their run. But there is nevertheless some indication
that what happened during the 1890s is happening once more.
Again, there is a rising privacy panic, brought on by anxieties
connected to new communications technologies. Again, the
"death of privacy" is being widely forecast. And again, there are
calls for changes in the law to meet these problems.

and Daniel J. Solove, Prosser's Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 Cal L Rev 1887, 1889
(2010).
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As argued above, it makes a significant difference what
underlies these expressions of alarm. If the rising anxiety is due
to an increase in privacy intrusions enabled by new technologies,
then it is imperative for the law to step in and improve
enforcement of existing norms. But if the fears being expressed
are due instead to changes in privacy itself, then it is
substantially less clear how or even if the law should respond.
Adopting new laws or regulations in order to shore up a
weakening privacy regime risks ossification. 15 1 This can leave
the community locked in to a suboptimal set of norms,
artificially sustained by the difficulty of switching. 152
A privacy crisis therefore requires policymakers to
determine the source of that crisis before responding. But
distinguishing between norm violations and norm shifts is
difficult, because the differences are subtle. In both cases,
existing norms are violated. In both cases, the violators have
likely not internalized those norms. But in the first case, persons
violating the norm do not do so out of any sense that a different
norm should govern their behavior; they just see an opportunity
to easily violate a norm that others adhere to. In the second
case, the violators are following a different set of rules, one that
has been adopted by a subset of the relevant community. At the
beginning of a norm shift, the adherents of a new norm regime
may not have any clear sense of what the new norms are or even
that they are different than the ones that came before.
Nevertheless, it may be possible to distinguish between
seemingly stable norms that are being violated and those whose
very legitimacy is being challenged. As detailed below, there is
some evidence that the latter is occurring, for at least some
privacy norms. But even assuming that we are in the midst of a
norm transition, that assumption leads to a second question:
what if the new privacy regime is objectively worse than the one
we have now? It may be worth the risk of ossification if the
existing norm regime promotes social welfare more than its

'' Ed Baker is one of the few who have addressed this issue in the context of privacy
law. See Baker, 21 Soc Phil & Pol at 251-53 (cited in note 145). See also Post, 77 Cal L
Rev at 975 (cited in note 9) (arguing that limiting privacy tort actions "preserves the
flexibility and vitality of social life, which undoubtedly would be hardened and otherwise
altered for the worse if every indiscretion could be transformed into formal legal action").
152 In complexity theory, the phenomenon is known as getting trapped on a local
maximum. See, for example, Stuart Kauffman, The Origins of Order: Self-Organization
and Selection in Evolution 36-40, 214-15 (Oxford 1993).
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proposed replacement. This potential for a retrograde privacy
shift would seem to call for a balancing of the costs and benefits
of one regime versus another in order to determine which is
socially optimal.
Unfortunately, as I argue below, such a balancing is likely
impossible by any person currently invested in the existing norm
regime. We are by nature bound up in the norms that define us.
There is no way to step outside of our own culture and evaluate
it from a remote vantage point. In any contest between the
current norm regime and an untested replacement judged by
someone who has succeeded under the current norms, the
current norms will always win. This incommensurability
problem again counsels caution on the part of policymakers
responding to a crisis arising from a possible norm shift.
A.

Modern Privacy Norms in Transition

Although it is too soon to tell for certain if a norm shift is
underway, there are signs that that is the case. Four are
discussed below. First, the conditions appear to be favorable: the
social impact of the revolution in information technologies over
the past thirty years is poised to rival that of the Industrial
Revolution of the late nineteenth century. Second, there is some
indication that one victim of new information technologies may
be the separation of roles that was responsible for modern
notions of privacy in the first place. Third, much of the alarm
relates to potential harms rather than tangible harms resulting
from privacy violations, indicating that it is the opacity of a
future shift in status regimes that may be driving the concerns.
And finally, there is a noticeable theme of declension in recent
commentary, one that places a large amount of the blame for the
erosion of privacy on the very individuals who are losing it. This
sort of rhetoric signals a battle over the content of privacy
norms, not over their enforcement. It is the sort of rhetoric one
would expect at a time of norm transition, as adherents of the
old regime attempt to convince those departing from it of the
errors of their ways.
1.

Changing conditions.

Technological developments have brought a significant
change in privacy norms within the realm of the plausible. The
rise of networked computers and portable digital devices
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appears to be producing a fundamental shift in society, altering
how information is collected, produced, distributed, and storedin short, how information is assimilated and understood-not
just by large organizations and governments, but by everyone.
Three significant effects are immediately clear. First, pervasive
documentation has become democratized. With digital media, it
is simple and inexpensive for individuals, businesses, and
governments alike to record the world around them through
audio or video, to record individuals' movements or transactions
through receipts or logs, or to record thoughts, ideas, or
impressions in documents, messages, posters, presentations, and
other media. Whereas in the island communities of 1870, every
movement and transaction was likely to be observed by one or
more neighbors, now every move, every communication, every
interaction, and many thoughts are recorded in one or more
devices, by others or by ourselves.
Second, the cost-or "friction"-of transferring all of that
information far and wide has vastly decreased. 153 It is now easy
for ordinary individuals to transmit information not only
worldwide, but to large numbers of people, a feat whose
prohibitive expense previously required a large-scale enterprise.
The prevalence of information and the ease with which it can be
transmitted means that individuals and businesses are easier to
find-it is easier to identify someone based on only a few clues,
or to find a person or a business to communicate or transact
with. 15 4 The effect is, again, something of a return to the island
community of 1870, only now the island community is Earth.
Third, it is a trivial matter to store large amounts of these
digital flotsam and jetsam. That means that our devices and
communications networks have a memory. The records and
messages being created today are more or less permanently
archived, enabling them to be recalled and used later, in
different contexts, using technologies not available now. The
long memory of small towns has been restored.
The consequences of all of this for society are profound, and
we have barely begun to plumb their depths. As Google CEO
153 More specifically, the technology exists that permits low-friction sharing.
Whether such technologies should be implemented is a different question. See generally
William McGeveran, The Law of Friction,2013 U Chi Legal F 15.
m See Nick Bilton, Privacy Fades in Facebook Era, NY Times Bits Blog (Dec 12,
2011), online at http:/Ibits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/privacy-fades-in-facebook-eral
(visited Sept 15, 2013).
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Eric Schmidt has observed, "I don't believe society understands
what happens when everything is available, knowable and
recorded by everyone all the time."15 5 This is a significant shift
from the world in which our system of norms first developed.
The result is a large number of areas where existing law and
norms appear to be no longer controlling behavior that they used
to regulate effectively.
Consider, for example, the issue of privacy in public. It was
an unusual circumstance when an ordinary individual in the
twentieth century had to worry about maintaining their privacy
in public. Only a few entities, such as large-scale enterprises like
magazines or news media, could violate an ordinary individual's
privacy by broadcasting their actions to a large audience. But
the circumstances in which a newspaper or magazine would
want to, say, place an average pedestrian on its cover were
rare. 156 As a result, a limited tort remedy, combined with the
ordinary operation of informal norms, was enough to control the
spread of information to the degree required by twentiethcentury norm regimes and the social roles and status
determinations that depended on them.
But widespread dissemination of information about
ordinary individuals-through anecdotes, or images, or personal
information-is now much more commonplace. And more is on
the way. Video capture is now possible by sufficiently small
devices and transmission or storage of video is sufficiently easy
that wearable cameras constantly in record mode are likely to
soon become prevalent. Every significant moment is likely to be
captured in digital media by some, and perhaps most, people
present. Facial recognition technology is also improving and, if
combined with constant video capture, could completely
eliminate the ability to anonymously walk down a street, at
least if the street is not entirely deserted.15 7 Smartphones are

iss

Holman W. Jenkins Jr, Google and the Search for the Future, Wall St J A9 (Aug
14, 2010). Schmidt then predicted, somewhat fancifully, that as a result "every young
person one day will be entitled automatically to change his or her name on reaching
adulthood" in order to escape this effect.
156 For a famous example, see Arrington v New York Times, 434 NE2d
1319, 1320
(NY 1982).
1'
See John Diaz, An In- Your-Face Technology, SF Chron F2 (June 12, 2011)
(quoting a PC World article describing facial recognition technology as "the end of
privacy as we know it-imagine a world in which someone can simply take a photo of you
on the street, in a crowd, or with a telephoto lens, and discover everything about you on
the Internet").
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becoming more capable as well, acquiring both video
conferencing and voice recognition capabilities, making it easier
to connect to anyone or any information accessible on the
Internet. Soon it may become common for a person to be
accompanied in his or her daily activities by a travelling Greek
chorus of friends, sharing and commenting on everything that
anyone within their circle sees. In such an environment, the
wide distribution of information about individuals will become
frequent, not rare, placing it beyond the ability of high-cost civil
litigation to effectively police.
The shift now occurring represents something of an
unwinding of the transformation that confronted Warren and
Brandeis in 1890. Whereas The Right to Privacy was a reaction
to the onset of mass communications, a single universe of print
and popular culture that connected all social groups and classes
alike, the present transformation is witnessing the slow
dismantling of mass media and mass communications. 5 8
Instead, we are transitioning to an informational world that is
much more decentralized and much more interconnected. The
social ramifications of those changes will have consequences
that have only begun to play out, but they may be on a par with
those of the late nineteenth century.159
2.

Collapsing roles.

One casualty of these changes may be the very notion that
modern privacy was founded on: the division of an individual's
social existence into separate, and separately evaluated, roles.
In other words, we may be about to come full circle, with the
dissolution of the role-specific and context-specific status
determinations that the economic changes of the late nineteenth
century brought into being.1 60 The notion of distinct social roles

158 Caution is warranted here. Forecasts of the death of various widely
distributed
media-films, books, broadcast television, newspapers-date back decades. Even if one
of these transformations eventually comes to pass, it may be despite such forecasts
rather than in accordance with them.
159
This is reasonably open to debate, however. In terms of economic output alone,
economists disagree whether Internet technologies are likely to lead to the same growth
in productivity as previous technological revolutions. See Steve Lohr, Looking to
Industry for the Next Digital Disruption NY Times (NY Times Nov 23, 2012), online at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/24/technology/internet/ge-looks-to-industry-for-thenext-digital-disruption.html (visited Sept 15, 2013).
'60 The concern that new technologies could put pressure on the maintenance of

210

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2013

is a critical component of most contemporary Americans'
personalities: the central premise of one of the core theories of
modern sociology is that "the individual should be viewed as a
collection of social roles." 6 1 Each role has a set of norms
associated with it, assessed by a particular social group. The
maintenance of such a system requires distinct status
determinations for each role, which in turn requires a
consideration of only a subset of information about each
individual-information about the person's performance in that
role as friend, co-worker, parent, etc.-rather than the broader
set of all information about an individual's activities.
The easy collection and distribution of information results
in a more densely interwoven web of social connections, meaning
that a person's behaviors are more likely to slip the bounds of
those physically present at the time, or even their close
associates, and spread far beyond that-and, like a wave in a
basin, eventually rebound and return to the source. This
threatens the current function of privacy norms in keeping
personal information within limited social or role-based
contexts. Reputational or shaming information-gossip, in other
words-may spread well beyond such limits to people the subject
does not even know, or does not know currently. 162 Archiving
and searchability will undermine the temporal context of
personal information as well as its physical context. 163 And our
current mix of laws and norms may be powerless to stem the
tide. Privacy norms adequate for governing the slow movement
separate roles dates back at least to Erving Goffman. See Erving Goffman, The
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life 137-40 (1959). See also James Grimmelmann,
Saving Facebook, 94 Iowa L Rev 1137, 1177-78 (2009).
161 James D. Montgomery, Toward a Role-Theoretic Conception of Embeddedness,
104 Am J Soc 92, 97 (1998). See also B.J. Biddle, Recent Developments in Role Theory, 12
Ann Rev Soc 67, 68 (1986).
162 See generally Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of
Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 Nw U L Rev 1667 (2008); Seth F. Kreimer,
Pervasive Image Capture and the FirstAmendment: Memory, Discourse, and the Right to
Record, 159 U Pa L Rev 335 (2011). The effects of increased distribution of reputational
information may be positive or negative. See Strahilevitz, 102 Nw U L Rev at 1718.
163 See Daniel J. Solove, The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on
the Internet 74 (Yale 2007) ("The Internet is transforming the nature and effects of
gossip. It is making gossip more permanent and widespread, but less discriminating in
the appropriateness of audience."); Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze at 7 (cited in note 4) ("At
the beginning of the twenty-first century, new technologies of communication have
increased the danger that intimate personal information originally disclosed to our
friends and colleagues may be exposed to-and misinterpreted by-a less understanding
audience.").
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of information in relatively close-knit associational communities
are unlikely to be adequate to police behaviors by distant
strangers far removed from one's physical proximity.164
If individuals cannot maintain informational boundaries
between their various roles, then the distinct faces they present
to the world will collapse into one. Indeed, that is exactly what is
forecast by Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg. "You have one
identity," Zuckerberg declared in 2009, perhaps prematurely.
"The days of you having a different image for your work friends
or co-workers and for the other people you know are probably
coming to an end pretty quickly." 165 If true, this would be a
profound shift in modern society. Modern society is based on the
transformation that occurred beginning around 1870, a
transformation that resulted in a separationof roles into distinct
realms where a subset of an individual's behaviors and traits
were assessed by separate social groups. Privacy law arose to
protect the emergence of that structure. The collapse of that
structure would represent a revolutionary change.
Our current laws and norms may be powerless to prevent
this. They were designed for a world of large mass and high
friction. In other words, our laws and norms have always
depended on a background assumption of high costs to
information distribution, making violations infrequent. 6 6 The
law could thus focus on large-scale operations engaged in
resource-intensive activities-businesses, government investigations, news media-leaving informal norms, enforced in faceto-face transactions with peers, to handle the rest. That mass
and friction constitute part of what Harry Surden has called

164 Consider the example of "Dog Poop Girl" that opens Daniel Solove's book, The
Future of Reputation. The moniker "Dog Poop Girl" refers to a Korean woman who failed
to clean up after her dog on a subway car. See Solove, Future of Reputation at 1-3 (cited
in note 163). There are longstanding norms for punishing a violation like that in real
space-dirty looks and vocal complaint are appropriate, physical assault and stalking
are not. But the norms for what is permitted online are unclear; worldwide, permanent
condemnation-the punishment actually inflicted on the woman-seems a bit excessive.
165 Chris Hoofnagle, The Facebook Enigma, Huffington Post (Sept 30, 2010), online
at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chris-jay-hoofnagle/the-facebook-enigma b 704677.
html (visited Sept 15, 2013). See also Jose Antonio Vargas, The Face of Facebook, New
Yorker 54 (Sept 20, 2010) (explaining that Zuckerberg's Facebook page describes his goal
as "trying to make the world a more open place").
i66 See Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L Rev 1605, 1612 (Fall
2007) ("[M]any privacy interests are protected not by positive legal prohibitions on
behavior, but by structural constraints which act as reliable substitutes for legal
constraints.").
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privacy's "structure,"167 or what courts have occasionally
referred to as "practical obscurity" 168-privacy resulting from the
fact that it is ordinarily too expensive to identify someone or
track someone's behavior based on idle curiosity. 169 That
structure has changed, and privacy norms adequate for
governing the slow movement of information in relatively closeknit associational communities are unlikely to be adequate to
police behaviors by distant strangers far removed from one's
physical proximity.
3.

Fear of the unknown.

A third sign of transition is the high levels of anxiety
expressed over actions that are not currently producing tangible
harms. Take, for example, the widespread unease over the
amount of information about ordinary individuals being
collected by businesses, government, and other institutions. 170
Sometimes the concern is described as a fear that mistakes will
be incorporated into the data that will prove difficult to
eradicate, 17 1 or that the information collected will be insecure.
Those are both legitimate concerns, but mistakes can just as
easily be corrected by more, rather than less, data, and security
of information has been an issue for as long as there have been
eavesdroppers. A more likely source of the recent surge in
concern is that customer information is now distributed among a
wide range of information brokers and purchasers who are

See id at 1606. By "structure," Surden means everything apart from law that
regulates behavior. Id.
167

168

United States Department of Justice v Reporters Committee for Freedom of the

Press, 489 US 749, 762 (1989).
169 The fact that there is far more information to sift through is unlikely to restore
practical obscurity; the power of search engines has more than kept pace with the
explosion in the amount of available information. See Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of
Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U Ill L Rev 1417, 1429-30 (2009) (improvements in
processing speed have outstripped growth in bandwidth).
See, for example, Blase Ur, et al, Smart, Useful, Scary, Creepy: Perceptions of
170
Online Behavioral Advertising (C1U CyLab Paper No 12-007, Apr 2, 2012), online at
http://www.futureofprivacy.orgwp-content/uploads/Smart-Useful-Scary-Creepy.Perceptions-of-Online-Behavioral-Advertising-.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013); Chris Jay
Hoofnagle, et al, Behavioral Advertising: The Offer You Cannot Refuse, 6 Harv L & Pol
Rev 273, 294-95 (2012); Gitte Laasby, Unprecedented Micro-Targeting by Campaigns
Creeps Out Voters, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel B1 (Nov 4, 2012).
171 See Jeffrey Rosen, Who Do They Think You Are?, NY Times Sunday Magazine
MM40 (Dec 2, 2012); John Markoff, You're Leaving a Digital Trail: Should You Care?,
NY Times BU1 (Nov 30, 2008).
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completely unknown to the consumer and whose information
practices are opaque. There is no way to know of, or even to
track, what is done with personal information and how securely
it is kept.

Indeed, something like that concern likely explains one of
the more common concerns expressed at constant data
collection, which is a sense of unease as to what is being done
with all of that information. Surveillance is a real privacy
harm, 172 one that can chill behavior and speech, and can be
harmful to the development of individual autonomy required for
a democratic society. 173 But for most collections of personal
information, whether by companies or by government, the
extent that the information is being used for surveillance is
unknown.17 4 Put differently, what is unclear about the new
world is the frequency with which nefarious or irrational people
will exploit their newfound ability to gather personal
information in order to subject individuals to tangible harms. 175
This remains true even after the recent revelations
concerning the National Security Agency's surveillance of
electronic communications.1 76 It -is now clear that the
government is collecting and searching the emails, telephone
calls, and other communications-perhaps even postal mail177of millions of Americans. But for any particular person, what is

172

173

See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U Pa L Rev 477, 495-96 (2006).
See Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as

Object, 52 Stan L Rev 1373, 1424 (2000); Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an
Information Society, 135 U Pa L Rev 707, 710, 733 (1987).
174
See, for example, Clapper v Amnesty Intl USA, 133 S Ct 1138, 1149 (2013)
(holding that there was no standing to challenge surveillance due to lack of knowledge of
the exact targets).
175 See Benny Evangelista, Phones with "6th Sense" Envisioned for Future,
SF Chron
at D1 (June 19, 2012) (quoting CEO of start-up: "The reality is there are deviants and
weird people all over the world"). Technologies that divulge information in new ways,
such as one's current location, tend to raise concerns that the information will be used
for much more nefarious purposes than it was previously. Evan Selinger, Why Do We
Love to Call New Technologies "Creepy'?,Slate Future Tense (Slate Aug 22, 2012), online
http: //www.slate.com/articles/technology/future tense/2012/08/facial-recognitionat
software targeted advertising-welove to call new technologiescreepy_.html (visited
Sept 15, 2013) ("Calling something creepy can be a way of saying, 'There's no immediate
problem, but I can foresee ways in which things might go wrong in the future."').
1'
See, for example, Charlie Savage, N.S.A. Said to Search Content of Messages to
and from U.S., NY Times, Al (Aug 8, 2013). The details of the NSA surveillance program
are still unclear.
177 See Ron Nixon, U.S. Postal Service Logging All Mail for Law Enforcement, NY
Times, Al (July 4, 2013).
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unclear, and what will likely remain unclear for some time, is
whether any government employee has scrutinized that person's
communications and learned sensitive information from it. Only
the latter sort of activity constitutes an actual privacy invasion,
as opposed to a reasonable fear of one.
We do not have enough experience with the online
accessibility of information to assess the probability of intrusion.
How many government employees, grudge-holders, or idly
curious individuals are likely to use new technologies to learn
sensitive facts about a particular person? Perhaps the world has
a relatively high percentage of such snoops, and the only thing
that has been holding them back has been the high cost of
obtaining the necessary information. Or perhaps anyone
disposed to be a snoop is willing to bear the paper-world costs to
engage in such behavior. An intermediate possibility might be
that some forms of malfeasants-misogynistic
stalkers,
perhaps178-have been unleashed by the lower costs of modern
harassment, but other sorts of persecutors remain deterred. We
will not know for certain until we have spent some time in the
reduced-transaction-cost world, at which point we will be able to
rely on evidence rather than suspicions. 179
As with all revolutions, what is most unsettling to those
heavily invested in the existing structure is that it is impossible
to predict where they will wind up in the social order that
emerges after the revolution is over.18 0 What provokes the
extreme levels of anxiety described earlier, manifesting as fears
of catastrophic upheaval, is the prospect of changes to an
established norm regime. In many ways, it can be the transition
itself that proves the most difficult and harmful, rather than the
state of society either before or after the transition. When a
prospective shift in norm regimes is at hand, it can be deeply
which
status
which norms
and, ultimately,
unclear
determinations ought to be followed. Even worse, the norms of a

"8 For a notorious example of misogyny unleashed, see Ellen Nakashima, Harsh
Words Die Hard on the Web, Wash Post Al (Mar 7, 2007).
19
There is a danger that people may grow comfortable with new practices before
their judgments about them coalesce. But given the subjective nature of privacy, it is not
clear in that case whether any harm would actually result from the practice, unless one
subscribes to a theory of privacy false consciousness.
ISOAgain, this is not an irrational or shallow fear. We all like to be respected by our
peers, and most of us have figured out ways of accomplishing that, even if imperfectly.
Suddenly changing the rules is disruptive.
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coalescing new regime may only be half-formed, and may be the
subject of some debate. No matter what choice a person makes,
ither persisting
he or she risks getting caught between worlds
in following old practices in a world governed by a different set
of rules or switching too quickly to new norms that never quite
take hold. People who expect information to remain within its
traditional confines may be unpleasantly surprised. 181 People
who believe that the world has changed may be similarly
surprised when they encounter someone in a position of
authority with the opposite view. 182 Until the transition is
complete, disputes over what rules apply, or should apply, will
be common. 183
4.

Moral suasion.

A fourth sign of a norm shift in progress is the frequent
attempts to criticize the morality of those who forgo their own
privacy. 184 As norm regimes begin to shift, norm entrepreneurs
often emerge on either side, arguing for holding the line or
jettisoning the old. 185 Modern norm entrepreneurs such as Mark
Zuckerberg have attempted to convince others that trying to
maintain role boundaries, or refusing to widely disclose

See Tom Zeller Jr, Lest We Regret Our DigitalBread Crumbs, NY Times C5 (June
12, 2006) (quoting John Battelle: "We are living online, but have yet to fully realize the
implications of doing so.").
182
See Andrew Couts, Who Killed Privacy? You Did, Digital Trends
(Aug 7, 2012),
online
at
http://www.digitaltrends.com/opinion/state-of-the-web-who-killed-privacy/
(visited Sept 15, 2013) ("[N]o one yet knows the long-term consequences of making so
much of ourselves known to the world. . . . Perhaps we will all just accept that everyone
has dirty laundry, and overlook the salacious details that might pop up about a person
from time to time. (Not a chance, I'd say.)"). There is nevertheless some evidence that, in
fact, once such disclosures become widespread, their salience and stigmatizing effect will
decrease. See generally Alon Harel and Alon Klement, The Economics of Stigma: Why
More Detection of Crime May Result in Less Stigmatization, 36 J Legal Stud 355 (2007).
'ss The companies managing social media sites, for example, change the rules
governing disclosures on a regular basis, often retroactively. See, for example, Taek
Kwon, Friendster's Sneak Attack on Your Anonymity, blPlog (Sept 29, 2005), online at
http://www.boalt.org/biplog/archive/000631.html (visited Sept 15, 2013).
'84 See Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze at 195 (cited in note 4) ("Will we be passive in the
face of technological determinism, or do we have the vision to insist on rebuilding the
privacy we have lost?").
185 See Sunstein, 96 Colum L Rev at 929 (cited in 30). Sunstein appears to consider
only the proponents of change to be norm entrepreneurs, but given the invisibility of
status and norm regimes, see text accompanying notes 67-69, even those opposed to
change need to innovate when called upon to defend what never needed explanation
before.
181
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information, is worse than old-fashioned: it's dishonest.'8 6 Or as
Zuckerberg has put it, "Having two identities for yourself is an
example of a lack of integrity."'8 7 Others insist that an
increasing lack of respect for such boundaries is not simply a
public policy debate, but evidence of a deep moral decline. 88
The struggle to define the moral valence of role
maintenance is probably what explains much of the expressed
concern or disdain at "oversharing"-voluntarily disclosing too
much information about oneself online. Criticism of oversharing
has reached a fever pitch in recent years.'8 9 Now, as in the late
nineteenth century, the purpose of the criticism appears to be to
reinforce existing norms by shaming those who depart from
them. In one typical recent salvo, New York Times columnist
Roger Cohen denounced the "unctuous ooze of status updates
and vacation snaps seeping across Facebook and Twitter and the
rest." To call it "information overload," Cohen harrumphed,
"would be to debase the word 'information."' 190 The fear is that if
disclosure of information about one's own life becomes
widespread, disclosure of such information by others will not
seem so transgressive.191 The criticism of oversharing is thus one
front in a wider war against norm change.

us Among law professors, Richard Posner has been making this argument for
decades. See Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 Ga L Rev 393, 395 (1978);
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 40 (Aspen 7th ed 2007).
187 Hoofnagle, Facebook Enigma, Huffington Post (cited in note 165). Others have
argued that privacy must be rebalanced against other values, such as security, in light of
modern developments. See, for example, the debates discussed in Priscilla M. Regan,
Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values, and Public Policy 181-90 (UNC 1995).
's See, for example, Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze at 223 (cited in note 4) (attributing
invasions of privacy to larger cultural crisis); Garret Keizer, A Social Kind of Selfishness,
Boston Globe K12 (Sep 16, 2012); Ruth Marcus, Sheen Madness, Wash Post PostPartisan
Blog (Wash Post Mar 3, 2011), online at http://voices.washingtonpost.com/postpartisan/
2011/03/sheenmadness.html (visited Sept 15, 2013).
18s See, for example, Roger Cohen, Thanks for Not Sharing, Intl Herald Tribune 8
(Dec 7, 2012); Ruth Marcus, Sheen Madness, Washington Post A19 (Mar 4, 2011); John
D. Sutter, The Internet and the "End of Privacy", CNN (CNN Dec 13, 2010), online at
http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/web/12/13/end.of.privacy.intro/index.html (visited Sept
15, 2013); Eric Auchard, We're All Celebrities in Post-Privacy Age, Reuters (June 22,
2007), online at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/06/22/celebrities-privacy-idUKNOA24
969820070622 (visited Sept 15, 2013); Tara Bahrampour, On the Web, "Dear Diary"
Becomes "DearWorld", Wash Post B2 (Jan 2, 2007).
"e Cohen, Thanks for Not Sharing, Intl Herald Tribune (Dec 7, 2012) (cited in note
189).
191 See, for example, Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 Wm & Mary L Rev 723,
730-32 (1999) (expressing concern that increased media exhibitionism indicates longterm decline in the desire for privacy).
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Some of the most heated battles involve the behavior of
young people. In many cases there is a palpable sense of
schadenfreude at the potential negative consequences of
overexposure. The aim is often not to instruct the
unknowledgeable, but rather to punish the selfish and correct
the wayward. 192 "All good things must come to an end," the New
York Times editorial board announced in 2006, "including the
chance to post lascivious photographs and diary entries on the
Internet without repercussions ... What [young people] are
getting now is an education in the virtues of privacy." 193 The
privacy consequences can be seen as just deserts as well as
unfortunate accident. Reports of employers searching social
media for information about young applicants may have a
similar effect. 194 While much of the reporting may be a public
service for the young, it also serves as norm education. Indeed, it
is possible that employers too are engaging in norm
maintenance as much as they are reducing risk.1 95
There is substantial reason to doubt, however, that young
social media users are simply unaware of privacy concerns.
Users of social media and other electronic communication tools
have clearly not abandoned the notion of keeping their
information private; studies are clear, in fact, that they take
their own privacy seriously and take steps to protect it.196 It is
192 See, for example, Sheila Marikar, After Years of Telling
All, 20-Somethings Start
to Clam Up, ABC News (Mar 1, 2007), online at http://abcnews.go.com/US/Technology/
story?id=2912364&page=l#.UWCzoFt35k8 (visited Sept 15, 2013); Robert J. Samuelson,
A Web of Exhibitionists, Wash Post A25 (Sept 20, 2006); Alorie Gilbert, As Teens
Embrace Blogs, Schools Sound an Alarm, CNET News (Nov 15, 2005), online at
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1025_3-5952141.html (visited Sept 15, 2013).
193 Online Party Crashers,NY Times C11 (June 18, 2006).
194 See Marvin Krislov, Social Media Users Should Be Cautious,
Columbus Dispatch
11A (Dec 28, 2010), online at http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/editorials/2010
/12/28/social-media-users-should-be-cautious.html (visited Sept 15, 2013); Alan Finder,
For Some, Online Persona Undermines a Rgsum6 (NY Times June 11, 2006), online at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/11/us/ilrecruit.html?pagewanted=all (visited Sept 15,
2013).
195 Although not involving employers, this norm education goal may explain the
efforts of a church youth group that investigated its members' social media profiles and
posted them, out of context, on the walls of an auditorium. See Martha Irvine, A Little
Too Public? Privacy a Concern as Social Online Sites Become Fair Game, Sydney
Morning Herald (AP Jan 1, 2007), online at http://www.smh.com.aulnews/Technology/Alittle-too-public-Privacy-a-concern-as-social-online-sitesbecome-fairgame/2006/12/30/1166895499620.html (visited Sept 15, 2013).
196 See Stefanie Olsen, Study: Majority of Teens Stay Private Online, CNET News
(Jan 8, 2007), online at http://news.cnet.com/2100-1038_3-6148192.html (visited Sept 15,
2013); Mary Madden, Privacy Management on Social Media Sites (Pew Research Center
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just that those steps are different from the ones that adherents
to established privacy norms would take. 197 They are different
because they are based on a different notion of what information
should be shared, how it should be shared, and who it should be
shared with. 198
In part, the norm transition is occurring because of the way
that social media is altering remote interactions. While previous
technologies have increased the speed and ease of sending
individual messages, communications over social media have an
ever-present quality that moves them from the atypical to the
quotidian. Social media allows "ambient awareness," an
information exchange that resembles the small details one picks
up from being in physical proximity to someone.19 9 That sort of
connection has a social impact; it allows "individuals to present
themselves, articulate their social networks, and establish or
maintain connections with others" in new ways, across vast
physical and social distances, and forming new sorts of informal
groups. 200 Sharing information that would not otherwise be the
subject of written communication is a common way to build
social capital in that setting.201 But the rules and expectations
for information shared in this way are still being worked out.
Feb 24, 2012), online at http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2012/Privacy-managementon-social-media.aspx (visited Sept 15, 2013). See generally Kevin Lewis, Jason Kaufman,
and Nicholas Christakis, The Taste for Privacy: An Analysis of College Student Privacy
Settings in an Online Social Network, 14 J Computer-Mediated Commu 79 (2008)
(explaining that college students select various methods to protect privacy on social
media).
197 See Matt Miller, Privacy Isn't Dead With Millennials, It's Thriving, Forbes
(Nov
8, 2012), online at http://www.forbes.com/sites/mattmiller/2012/11/08/privacy-isnt-deadwith-millennials-its-thriving/ (visited Sept 15, 2013).
198 See Lewis, Kaufman, and Christakis, 14 J Computer-Mediated
Commu at 96
(cited in note 196) ("When a new technology such as Facebook is released, there is a high
degree of ambiguity over appropriate norms of conduct-the very definition of this space
as public or private is contested.'),
199 See Clive Thompson, I'm So Totally, Digitally Close to You, NY Times Mag 42
(Sept 7, 2008).
2
Nicole B. Ellison, Charles Steinfeld, and Cliff Lampe, The Benefits of Facebook
"Friends:"Social Capital and College Students' Use of Online Social Network Sites, 12 J
Computer-Mediated Commu 1143, 1143 (2007). See also Judith Donath, Signals in
Social Supernets, 13 J Computer-Mediated Commu 231, 243-44 (2007). Michael Madison
has suggested that such informal groups may be one of the more significant
consequences of Internet technology. See Michael J. Madison, Social Software, Groups,
and Governance, 2006 Mich St L Rev 153, 156-57 (2006).
2o1 See generally Ellison, Steinfeld, and Lampe, 12 J Computer-Mediated Commu 1
(cited in note 200); John Tierney, As the Grapevine Withers, Spam Filters Take Root, NY
Times (May 22, 2007), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/22/science/22tier.html
(visited Sept 15, 2013) (noting that gossip defines social circle).
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And it confounds and disturbs those used to interacting remotely
in more formal, self-contained communications.
B.

The Response of Privacy Law

If the current privacy crisis is in fact generated in part by a
norm shift, then what should the legal response be? Obviously, if
the new norms represent an improvement over the old, the law
should not step in to forestall change. Even so, that does not
mean that regulators must stay their hands entirely. For
example, no matter what the state of the debate over privacy
norms, new laws or regulations are properly invoked to combat
actions that cause tangible harm-"dead bodies," as Ann Bartow
has put it.202 Privacy law can alter the balance of power,
counteracting increases in identity theft, fraud, threats to
personal safety, and emotional distress. There is also little risk
in using the law to protect those norms that are likely to
continue to prove stable-norms that have existed relatively
unchanged for generations and show no sign of abating, such as
the norm that it is a privacy violation to distribute images taken
of someone naked without their consent. But at a time of norm
transition, policymakers should take care that any new laws
that are adopted are flexible enough to account for changing
circumstances, such as by incorporating standards for judges or
juries to exercise discretion or by assigning key determinations
to regulatory agencies. Otherwise, there is the risk that fading
norms will be locked in by the force of law well past their
expiration date.
All of that assumes that adoption of the new norms would
be socially beneficial. But what if that proves not to be the case?
In that event, it might seem perfectly appropriate to use new
laws or regulations to stave off change. Norms are not just a set
of arbitrarily selected coordination rules; they are social
obligations with a moral imperative behind them. They are a
society's determination of what it is right to do. And sometimes
a large portion of society can be egregiously mistaken in those

202 See Ann Bartow, A Feeling of Unease About Privacy Law,
155 U Pa L Rev
PENNumbra 52, 52 (2006). Bartow makes a different point than the one being made
here; her argument is that privacy scholars should identify the tangible harms that
result from privacy violations in order to convince legislators and others why protecting
privacy is important. See id at 53. She does not argue that privacy legislation should be
restricted to such cases of tangible harms.
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determinations. Nevertheless, it is impossible for someone
acting within a norm regime to evaluate it or any other set of
norms objectively. There is thus no way to accurately balance
the costs and benefits. We can never know if it would be better
to switch or to stay with a given set of privacy norms.
Despite this problem, some theorists, most notably Helen
Nissenbaum, have attempted to spell out an account of privacy
that not only recognizes its basis in norms, but also considers
the potential for norm change. Nissenbaum even proposes a
mechanism for addressing the challenge posed here:
determining whether a proposed shift in norms would on
balance be better for society. Nissenbaum's account is therefore
worth considering in detail.
1.

Norm change in Nissenbaum's contextual integrity
framework.

Most theories of privacy appear to view privacy as a
fundamental and stable human right, a certain fixed set of
minimum acceptable practice necessary for human dignity,
autonomous thought, democracy, or other important values. 203
Only a few privacy scholars have explored the ramifications of
privacy's reliance on norms, most prominently Daniel Solove
and Helen Nissenbaum. Solove, for example, characterizes
privacy as a dimension of certain practices, such as "writing
letters, talking to one's psychotherapist, engaging in sexual
intercourse, making certain decisions, and so on." 2 04 Privacy in
Solove's account is a set of "customs, norms, and traditions" that
are a component part of such practices, and thus "protecting
'privacy' involves guarding against disruptions to these
practices that undermine the privacy norms, customs, and
traditions associated with them. 205 As a result of being defined
in terms of "customs, norms, and traditions," privacy has no

203 Most of the theories catalogued in Solove, 90 Cal L Rev at 1099-1124 (cited in
note 11), appear to adopt this view. See, for example, id at 1111 (describing Charles
Fried's theory as defining "privacy as 'control over knowledge about oneself' that is
necessary to protect 'fundamental relations' of 'respect, love, friendship and trust"'). The
problem with such theories, as James Whitman has noted, is that they fail to account for
the starkly different notions of privacy held in otherwise free and democratic societies
around the world. See Whitman, 113 Yale L J at 1154 (cited in note 26).
20
Solove, 90 Cal L Rev at 1129 (cited in note 11).
20
Id. Solove somewhat circularly defines privacy practices as including the
"activities" that then privacy is a component of. Id.
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acontextual core that can be defined and evaluated apart from a
particular set of practices occurring at a particular place and
time. 206 But Solove stops short of providing a way to determine
what privacy requires, or should require, at any given moment,
saying only that "[w]e must make such determinations by
evaluating practices empirically, historically, and normatively,"
while remaining "responsive to social reality" and attuned to
"their historical development." 2 07 Merely preserving traditional
practices is not sufficient, he argues, nor is focusing on current
trends. 208 It is not clear how Solove would evaluate a conflict
between the two.
Helen Nissenbaum provides such an analysis in her book,
Contextual Integrity. Nissenbaum's work represents the most
substantial and sophisticated effort to define privacy in a way
that accounts for privacy's basis in norms rather than in a fixed
set of values. 209 Key to her approach is that Nissenbaum
provides only a "framework" for understanding privacy, rather
than a theory, 210 which allows her to avoid the difficult question
of what, exactly, privacy consists of at any given time by leaving
that unspecified. Under Nissenbaum's framework, privacy is a
set of rules for maintaining "contextual integrity," that is,
keeping information flows within certain social contexts defined
by informational norms. 211 Informational norms, in turn, are
defined as prescribing "for a given context, the types of
information, the parties who are the subjects of the information
as well as those who are sending and receiving it, and the

Id at 1145.
Id at 1142.
208
Solove, 90 Cal L Rev at 1142 (cited in note 11).
209 Nissenbaum's framework has been extraordinarily influential in just the three
years since it was published. See, for example, Woodrow Hartzog and Frederic
Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 Cal L Rev 1, 32-33 (2013); Deirdre K.
Mulligan and Jennifer King, Bridging the Gap Between Privacy and Design, 14 U Pa J
Const L 989, 1005-16 (2012); Kenneth A. Bamberger and Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy
on the Books and on the Ground, 63 Stan L Rev 247, 298-302 (2011).
210 Nissenbaum consistently refers to her account as a "framework," not "a full-blown
theory of privacy." Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context at 189 (cited in note 11). Explaining
and defining the full dimension of the concept of privacy, apparently the task of a theory,
is, according to Nissenbaum, likely a "hopeless ambition." Id at 2. Nissenbaum's
"framework" therefore provides only a descriptive account of the factors that determine
"when people will perceive new information technologies and systems as threats to
privacy," which in turn helps in "formulat[ing] an approach to evaluating these systems
and prescribing legitimate responses to them." Id.
211 Id at 140.
206
207
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principles under which this information is transmitted." 212 The
primary goal of Nissenbaum's framework is descriptive-she
attempts to identify the conditions that produce privacy
controversies in a given society. According to Nissenbaum,
"indignation, protest, discomfit, and resistance to technologybased information systems and practices ... invariably can be
traced to breaches of context-relative informational norms." 213 In
other words, widespread violations of contextual integrity
produce alarm, the very sort of alarm described at the beginning
of this article. 2 14
But Nissenbaum has set her sights higher than merely
providing a framework for predicting the rise of privacy
controversies. She argues that her framework also has a
normative payoff-it can contribute to a determination of when
such reactions are not only likely to occur, but also when they
are justified. 2 15 Specifically, if the outcome of a contextual
integrity analysiS2 16 demonstrates that the practice in question
violates "entrenched informational norms," then it also is prima
facie unjustified. As the term "prima facie" should indicate,
Nissenbaum is careful to avoid the obvious objection to this
argument-that it simply reifies existing practices. Existing
privacy practices, she readily admits, can be suboptimal, even
harmful. 217 So Nissenbaum proposes only that existing norms
provide a baseline for determining the social value of certain
privacy practices; that is, there is only a presumption that the
existing norms are socially optimal. 218 That presumption can be
overcome, but "the burden of proof falls heavily upon the

Id at 141.
Id at 140.
214 Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context at 3 (cited in note 11) ("Information
technologies
alarm us when they flout these informational norms-when, in the words of the
framework, they violate contextual integrity.").
215 Id at 189-90 ("The framework of contextual integrity is intended as a descriptive
tool, systematically accounting for people's reactions to the myriad technical systems
radically affecting the flows of personal information. But it is also intended as a
framework for evaluating these systems from a moral and political point of view."). See
also id at 150.
216 Nissenbaum proposes a series of steps-what she terms the Contextual Integrity
Decision Heuristic-to determine whether a new system or practice violates contextual
integrity. See id at 149-50. The specifics of that analysis are not relevant here.
217 See id at 205.
218 See Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context at 164 (cited
in note 11).
212
213
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shoulders of proponents" of the new practice. 2 19 Given the
disruptions that violations of informational norms cause, 220
proponents of change must demonstrate that "special
circumstances are so compelling as to override this
prescription." 221
Nissenbaum's analysis sounds reasonable. The known and
the familiar will often seem preferable to the unknown and the
speculative. But that is precisely the problem. Indeed, not only
are the benefits of future norms difficult to predict, but we have
an inherent bias to see any change in norms as immensely
harmful, even if the ultimate result is on balance positive. That
may be why many scholars view current privacy practices as
essential to society even while privacy itself proves impossible to
define. And as the Warren and Brandeis episode shows, any
disruption to high status is perceived not simply as a threat to
individual status, but as a threat to society as a whole. Nissenbaum's descriptive account of contextual integrity is by design
an attempt to explain what causes privacy alarms; she correctly
attributes this to violations of informational norms. But there
may be little reliable connection between the extent of the alarm
and the benefit to society, all told, from preserving the norm.
Consider, as an example, a recent controversy in which a reader
called New York Times reporter Nick Bilton a "sociopath,"
evidently without intended exaggeration, and the paper's
ombudsman printed the letter without comment. Bilton's crime?
He believes thank-you emails are unnecessary. 222
Obviously that is an extreme overreaction, but that is the
point. When long-held norms are under challenge due to a
change in technology, adherents to the existing norms may lose
perspective. Nissenbaum's augmented contextual integrity
See id at 191.
Id at 164 ("For reasons of expectation, accumulated wisdom, and settled
rationale, a presumption in favor of entrenched, context-relative informational norms
makes sense.").
221
Id at 191. Daniel Solove has similarly proposed giving existing privacy practices a
sort of stare decisis effect. See Solove, 90 Cal L Rev at 1144 (cited in note 11).
222
See Margaret Sullivan, Thanks for Not Calling: A Digital Etiquette Column Is a
Disconnect for Readers, NY Times Public Editor's Journal (NY Times Mar 14, 2013),
at
http://publiceditor.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/14/thanks-for-not-calling-aonline
digital-etiquette-column-is-a-disconnect-for-readers/ (visited Sept 15, 2013); Nick Bilton,
BITS; Thanks? Don't Bother, NY Times B1 (Mar 11, 2013), online at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9403E5DC1638F932A25750COA9659D8
B63 (visited Sept 15, 2013).
219
220
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framework proposes a procedure for determining if a new
practice that violates existing informational norms nevertheless
may be justified. That analysis includes consideration of the
"moral and political factors affected by the practice in question,"
and a weighing of "how the system or practices directly impinge
on values, goals, and ends of the context."223 But any estimate of
costs and benefits of competing norms by someone invested in
the current norm structure-which would likely include
scholars, policy makers, judges, and lawyers-is almost
guaranteed to come out in favor of existing norms, and against
any change to those norms. Indeed, decisionmakers may not be
able to step outside of their norm regimes to consider the issue
from some sort of omniscient point of view even if they wanted
to. In other words, the calculation Nissenbaum proposes may
not be possible. The future and the present may be
incommensurable.
2.

Accounting for the privacy uncertainty principle.

None of the above means that privacy law should be
abandoned in the face of the slightest novel pressure. Rather, it
counsels in favor of modesty and humility about our ability to
forecast the ultimate outcome of changes underway. Other areas
of the law have incorporated limiting doctrines precisely to
account for such cognitive biases. First Amendment law
forswears an exception based on the falsity of political speech
because of the risk that those in power are highly likely to
regard dissenting views as false. 2 24 Copyright law largely
removes from judges the ability to restrict copyright's protection
based on an assessment of artistic merit. 225 Privacy law may
need a similar rule, intended to stay legislators' or common-law
judges' hands when an asserted novel privacy threat poses only

Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context at 182 (cited in note 11).
See United States v Alvarez, 132 S Ct 2537, 2546-48 (2012); Abrams v United
States, 250 US 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes dissenting) (stating that stifling dissent appears
to the person in power to be "perfectly logical").
225 See generally Bleistein v Donaldson Lithographing Co, 188 US 239 (1903). Some
scholars have argued that, despite the problem identified by Holmes, artistic judgments
in copyright law are unavoidable. See, for example, Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions
and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S Cal L Rev 247, 249-50 (1997); Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a
Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 Harv L Rev 683, 687 (2012) (describing
how courts are unable to avoid drawing lines "between ineffable artistic choice and mere
reproduction of reality").
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an inchoate threat to dignity or status. As the privacy harms
become more speculative, regulation should tread more lightly.
In particular, two sorts of changes should be resisted. First,
technological change may simply enable violations of longestablished norms without any sign of widespread challenge to
the validity of those norms. For example, there appears to be no
general challenge to longstanding norms of privacy in the home,
in individuals' naked bodies, or in the bathroom. 226 There is no
substantial resistance to the idea that stalking is morally
depraved. 227 Using the law to bolster these norms against
challenge poses no real difficulties of balancing trade-offs
between future benefits to other people and present benefits to
ourselves.
Second, and more difficult, are cases where norms are in
flux, or are not well developed, but where the harm experienced
is substantial and is concentrated in a small number of
individuals. For example, mobs can coalesce on the Internet to
target an individual for verbal abuse and threats that, while
perhaps no one of the messages may clearly rise to the level of
criminality or tortious behavior, the aggregate of the mob's
behavior takes a significant toll on the target. 228 For example,
women often experience substantially greater privacy harms
than men; several have been targeted by online mobs for gender
role enforcement. 229 Relatedly, an individual's own sensitive
information may escape his or her control, with a resulting
discontinuity in the harm suffered: from zero to a very large
number. 230 Commercial activities that pose a significant risk of
226 See, for example, Nate Anderson, Meet the Men Who Spy on Women
Through
Their Webcams, Ars Technica (Mar 10, 2013), online at http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2013/03/rat-breeders-meet-the-men-who-spy-on-women-through-their-webcams/
(visited Sept 15, 2013); Caille Millner, Public Humiliationover Private Photos (SF Chron
Feb 8, 2013), online at http: /www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/Public-humiliation-overprivate-photos-4264155.php (visited Sept 15, 2013); Jenna Wortham, When the Web's
Chaos Takes an Ugly Turn, NY Times BU3 (Oct 21, 2012).
227
See Elizabeth Olson, Though Many Are Stalked, Few Report It, Study Finds, NY
Times A22 (Feb 15, 2009).
228 See, for example, Tom Downey, Cyberposse, NY Times Sunday Magazine MM38
(Mar 7, 2010); John Schwartz, On the Web, Vengeance Is Mine (and Mine), NY Times
WK1 (Mar 24, 2004).
229 See, for example, Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 BU L
Rev 61
(2009); Brittan Heller, Of Legal Rights and Moral Wrongs: A Case Study of Internet
Defamation, 19 Yale J L & Fem 279 (2007); Jill Filipovic, Blogging While Female: How
Internet Misogyny Parallels'Weal-World" Harassment, 19 Yale J L & Fem 295 (2007).
230 See, for example, Jan Hoffman, A Girl's Nude Photo, and Altered Lives,
NY Times
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identity theft or compromise user account security likewise
impose significant burdens on the few individuals who suffer
those harms. Of course, all collection of consumer data imposes a
nonzero risk of security breaches; no information is entirely
secure. But where the risks become large enough to become
reasonably likely, legal regulation is an obvious solution.
Even in such cases, however, where technological change is
behind the circumstance that makes new law desirable, our
preference should be for legal regulation that can be altered in.
light of new information in the future. In particular, during a
technological shift new privacy law should tend toward the
adoption of administrative regulations or standards subject to
judicial interpretation, somewhat like the common law. That
may represent the ultimate genius of the solution posed in The
Right to Privacy. Warren and Brandeis proposed judicial
recognition of a common law cause of action to address the
harms that they foresaw. While many found their argument to
be persuasive, courts were cautious in following their
recommendation. The first decisions adopting the new privacy
law tort applied it in situations where its merits seemed the
most clear: the use of the images of nonconsenting individuals to
sell merchandise. 231
As a result, the tort narrowed considerably in application
from Warren and Brandeis's original vision of it, avoiding the
issues that would have arisen from giving the tort its full power
to prevent public discussion or representation of individuals.
Because of the pliable nature of the common law, the privacy
tort was adapted and limited as time passed and the crisis
atmosphere of the 1890s faded. It was never given its seemingly
intended role as a bulwark against social change arising from
mass communications. Prosser's classification of the tort in 1960
as four separate causes of action merely recognized what had
already transpired: courts had limited the tort's application to
those particular circumstances in which it seemed most
justifiable. 2 32 Even so, further limits were imposed, again by the
slow accretion of judicial decisions, in order to clear space for the

Al (Mar 27, 2011); Eli Saslow, Teen Tests Internet's Lewd Track Record, Wash Post Al
(May 29, 2007).
231 See, for example, Pavesich v New Eng Life Insurance Co, 50 SE 68 (Ga 1905).
232

William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal L Rev 383, 389 (1960).
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rise of free speech doctrine in the 1960s. The privacy torts were
in many states modified again to account for these trends. 2 33
IV. CONCLUSION
Our knowledge of the future is limited. It is limited not only
by our inability to foresee the course of future events, but also by
our own conceptual apparatuses. In other words, the fault is not
in our stars, but in ourselves. Our limited foreknowledge makes
the future especially murky when the harms we foresee are
harms to our dignity, and that dignity is in turn defined by
social rules that are themselves in flux. When the gloom
becomes thick enough, it can seem as though any downward
slope drops away precipitously into a fathomless abyss.
The dread aroused by a norm regime under threat makes it
difficult to determine the correct response to a privacy crisis.
Regulators and scholars assessing the state of privacy are as
bound by limits on human understanding as anyone else. They
are unable to distinguish between mere violations of established
privacy norms and a fundamental shift in those norms
themselves. Both appear to be violations to anyone invested in
the current privacy norm regime. And even if an incipient shift
in privacy norms could be identified, there is no way for anyone
whose interests are affected by that shift to objectively evaluate
whether the new norms are better.
But neither can privacy be forsaken. Privacy norms are
critical to the operation of society, even during periods of flux.
The only solution for regulators is to continue to combat privacy
violations where they arise, through new law if necessary, while
remaining cognizant of the dangers. A certain epistemic
humility is required where there are indications of a privacy
norm shift in progress, such as rapid technological changes,
heightened levels of alarm, and moralistic rhetoric. This is the
troubling consequence of the privacy uncertainty principle.
When we are disinterested, we can know what direction privacy
is headed; when we are interested, we can take a position on
where privacy should wind up. But we cannot do both.
233
See Barbas, 61 DePaul L Rev at 1021 (cited in note 19). Barbas dates the "death"
of the public disclosure of private facts tort-the one that most directly addressed
Warren and Brandeis's concerns-even earlier, to roughly the 1930s. See Samantha
Barbas, The Death of the Public Disclosure Tort: A Historical Perspective, 22 Yale J L &
Humanities 171, 173 (2010).

